@techreport{oai:toyama.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002095,
 author = {Hirai, Toshiyuki},
 month = {Apr},
 note = {application/pdf, In a public good economy, the core defined in the allocation space may not satisfy the external stability. Therefore, the core may differ from the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable set in the allocation space, whereas the core coincides with the stable set in the payoff space. We investigate indirect domination due to Harsanyi (1974, Management Science 20, 1472-1495) in the allocation space. We show that any sequence of dominations with a certain property constitutes indirect domination and eventually reaches into the core in the allocation space. Consequently, the core turns out to satisfy the external stability if we employ indirect domination instead of standard domination, and coincides with the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space. We also discuss the equivalence of the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space and the (sophisticated) stable set in the payoff space., Working Paper, Working Paper, No.270, 2012.4, Faculty of economics, university of toyama},
 title = {On the Stability of the Core in a Public Good Economy},
 year = {2012}
}