@techreport{oai:toyama.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002079,
 author = {Mizukami, Hideki and Wakayama, Takuma},
 month = {Aug},
 note = {application/pdf, We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires truth telling by each agent to be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and every Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism to be f-optimal. We show that restricted monotonicity plus an auxiliary condition is necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation, and that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2007)). The equivalence gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions in terms of restricted monotonicity., Working Paper},
 title = {Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria},
 year = {2007}
}