

582

The Rise of the Military Power,



almost the whole of authentic
 Japanese history is comprised in one
 vast episode: the rise and fall
 of the military power... It has
 been customary to speak of Japanese
 history as beginning with the ac-
 -cession of Jimmu Tennō, alleged
 to have reigned from 660 to 585 B.C.,
 and to have lived for one hundred
 and twenty-seven years. Before
 the time of the Emperor Jimmu
 was the Age of the Gods, - the
 period of mythology. But
 trustworthy history does not begin
 for a thousand years after the
 accession of Jimmu Tennō; and

The chronicles of those thousand years must be regarded as little better than fairy-tales. They contain records of fact; but fact and myth are so interwoven that it is difficult to distinguish the one from the other. We have legends, for example, of an alleged conquest of Korea in the year 202 A.D., by the Empress Jingō; and it has been tolerably well proved that no such conquest took place.* The later records are somewhat less mythical than the earlier. We have traditions, apparently founded on fact, of Korean immigration in the time of the fifteenth ruler, the

* See Aston's paper, "Early Japanese History," in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.

Emperor Ōjin; - then later traditions, also founded on fact, of early Chinese studies in Japan; - then some vague accounts of a disturbed state of society, which appears to have continued through the whole of the fifth century. Buddhism was introduced in the middle of the century following; and we have record of the fierce opposition offered to the new creed by a Shintō faction, and of a miraculous victory won by the help of the Four Deities, at the prayer of Shōtoku Taishi, - the great founder of Buddhism, and a regent of the Empress Suiko. With the firm establishment of Buddhism in the reign of that Empress

(593-628 A.D.) we reach the period of an authentic history, and of the thirty-third Japanese sovereign — counting from Jimmu Tennō.

Perhaps But although every thing prior to the seventh century remains obscured for us by the mists of fable, much can be inferred, even from the half-mythical records, concerning social conditions during the reigns of the first thirty-three Emperors and Empresses. It appears that the early Mikado lived very simply — scarcely better, indeed, than their subjects. The Ohinō scholar Mabuchi tells us that they dwell in huts with mud walls and roofs of shingle; that they

wore hempen clothes; that they carried their swords in simple wooden scabbards, bound round with the tendrils of a wild vine; that they walked about freely among the people; that they carried their own bows and arrows when they went to hunt. But as society developed wealth and power, this early simplicity disappeared; and the gradual introduction of Chinese customs and etiquette effected great changes. The Empress Suikō introduced Chinese court-ceremonies, and first established among the nobility the Chinese grades of rank. Chinese luxury, as well as Chinese learning, soon made its appearance at Court; and thereafter

588

The imperial authority appears to have been less and less directly exerted. The new ceremonialism must have rendered the personal exercise of the multifarious imperial functions more difficult as before; and it is probable that the temptation to act more or less by deputy would have been strong even in the case of an energetic ruler. At all events we find that the real administration of government began about this time to pass into the hands of deputies, — all of whom were members of the great Kuge clan of the Fujiwara.

This clan, which included the highest hereditary priesthood, represented a majority of the

ancient nobility, claiming divine descent. Ninety-five out of the total one hundred and fifty-five families of Kuge belonged to it, — including the five families, Go-Sekke, from which alone the Emperor was by tradition allowed to choose his Empress. His historic name dates only from the reign of the Emperor Kwammu (782-806 A.D.), who bestowed it as an honour upon Nakatomi no Kamatari; but the clan had long previously held the highest positions at Court. By the close of the seventh century most of the executive power had passed into its hands. Later the office of Kwambaku, or Regent, was established, and remained hereditary in the house down to modern times — ages after all real power had been taken from the

K. & C. O. O. O.

descendants of Nakatomi no Kamatari.
 But during almost five centuries the
 Fujiwara remained the veritable
 regents of the country, and took
 every possible advantage of their
 position. All the civil offices were
 in the hands of Fujiwara men;
 all the wives and favourites of
 the Emperors were Fujiwara women.
 The whole power of government was
 thus kept in the hands of the
 clan; and the political authority
 of the Emperor ceased to exist.
 Moreover the succession was regu-
 -lated entirely by the Fujiwara;
 and even the duration of each
 reign was made to depend upon
 their policy. It was deemed
 advisable to compel Emperors to
 abdicate at an early age, and
 after abdicating to become Buddhist

months, — the successor chosen being of ten a mere child. There is record of an Emperor ascending the throne at the age of two, and abdicating at the age of four; another mikado was appointed at the age of five; several at the age of ten. Yet the religious dignity of the throne remained undiminished, or, rather, continued to grow. The more the Mikado was withdrawn from public view by policy and by ceremonial, — the more did his seclusion and inaccessibility serve to deepen the awe of the divine legend. Like the Lama of Thibet the living deity was made invisible to the multitude; and gradually

the belief arose that to look upon his face was death... It is said that the Fujiwara were not satisfied even with these despotic means of assuring their own domination, and that luxurious forms of corruption were maintained within the palace for the purpose of weakening the character of young emperors who might otherwise have found the energy to assert the ancient rights of the throne.

~~Don~~ Perhaps this usurpation — which prepared the way for the rise of the military power — has never been rightly interpreted. The history of all the patriarchal societies

of ancient Europe will be found to illustrate the same phase of social evolution. At a certain period in the development of each we find the same thing happening, — the withdrawal of all political authority from the Priest-King, who is suffered, nevertheless, to retain the religious dignity. It may be a mistake to judge the policy of the Fujiwara as a policy of mere ambition and usurpation. The Fujiwara were a religious aristocracy, claiming divine origin, — clan-chiefs of a society in which religion and government were identical, and holding to that society much the same relation as that

of the Eupatridæ to the ancient Attic Society. The Mikado had originally become supreme magistrate, military commander, and religious head by consent of a majority of the clan-chiefs, — each of whom represented to his own following what the "Heavenly Sovereign" represented to the social aggregate. But as the power of the ruler extended with the growth of the nation, those who had formerly united to maintain that power began to find it dangerous. They decided to deprive the Heavenly Sovereign of all political and legal authority, without disturbing in any way his religious supremacy.

At Athens, at Sparta, at Rome, and elsewhere in ancient Europe the same policy was carried out, for the same reasons,

by religious senates. The history of the early kings of Rome, as interpreted by Mr. de Coulanges, best illustrates the nature of the antagonism developed between the priest-rulers and the religious aristocracy; but the same thing took place in all the Greek communities, with about the same result. Everywhere political power was taken away from the early kings; but they were mostly left in possession of their religious dignities and privileges: they remained supreme priests after having ceased to be rulers. This was the case also in Japan; and I imagine that future Japanese historians will be able to give us an entirely

new interpretation of the Fujiwara episode,
 as reviewed in the light of modern
 sociology. At all events, there can
 be little doubt that, in curbing
 the powers of the Heavenly Sovereign,
 the religious aristocracy must have
 been actuated by conservative precau-
 -tion as well as by ambition. There
 had been various Emperors who made
 made changes in the laws and
 customs - changes which could ^{scarcely} have
 have been viewed with favour by
 many of the ancient nobles; -
 there had been an Emperor whose
 diversions can today be written of
 only in Latin; - there had even
 been an Emperor - Kōtoku - who,
 though "God Incarnate", and chief
 of the ancient faith, "despised
 the Way of the Gods", and cut
 down the holy grove of the
 shrine of Iku-kuni-dama.

Kōtoku, for all his Buddhist ^{piety} (perhaps, indeed, because of it) was one of the wisest and best of rulers; but the example of a heavenly sovereign "despising the Way of the Gods," must have given the priestly class matter for serious reflection...

Besides, there is another important fact to be noticed. The Imperial household proper had become, in the course of centuries, entirely detached from the Uji; and the omnipotence of this unit, independent of all other units, constituted in itself a grave danger to aristocratic privileges and established institutions.

Too much might depend upon the personal character and will of an omnipotent God-King, capable of breaking with all

clan-custom, and of abrogating clan-
 -privileges. On the other hand,
 there was safety for all alike
 under the patriarchal rule of
 the clan, which could check
 every tendency on the part of
 any of its members to exert pre-
 -dominant influence at the expense
 of the rest. But for obvious
 reasons the Imperial cult, - tradi-
 -tional source of all authority
 and privilege, - could not be
 touched: it was only by main-
 -taining and reinforcing it that
 the religious nobility could expect
 to keep the real power in their
 hands. They actually kept it
 for nearly five centuries.

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line

Shichu

The history of all the Japanese regencies, however, amply illustrates the general rule that an inherited authority is ever and everywhere liable to find itself supplanted by a deposed authority. The Fujiwara appear to have eventually become the victims of that luxury which they had themselves, for reasons of policy, introduced and maintained. Degenerating into a mere court-mobility, they made little effort to exert any direct authority in other than civil directions, entrusting military matters almost wholly to the Buké. In the eighth century the distinction between military and civil organization had been made upon the Chinese

plan ;—and the great military class.
 Men came into existence, and began
 to extend its power rapidly. Of the
 military clans proper, the most
 powerful were the Minamoto and
 the ^{Taira} Taira. By depending on these clans
 the conduct of all important
 matters relating to war, the Fuji-
 wara eventually lost their
 high position and influence. As
 soon as the Kamakura found them-
 selves strong enough to lay
 hands upon the reins of gov-
 ernment, — which happened about
 the middle of the eleventh cen-
 tury, — the Fujiwara supremacy
 became a thing of the past, al-
 though members of the clan con-
 tinued for centuries to occupy
 positions of importance under various
 regents.

But the Bunké could not realize their ambition without a bitter struggle among themselves, — the longest and the fiercest war in Japanese history. The Minamoto and the Taira were both Kugé; — both claimed imperial descent. In the early part of the contest the Taira carried all before them; and it seemed that no power could hinder them from exterminating the rival clan. But fortune turned at last in favour of the Minamoto; and at the famous sea-fight of Dan-no-ura, in 1185, the Taira were themselves exterminated.

Then began the reign

of the Minamoto regents, or rather Shōguns. I have elsewhere said that the title "Shōgun" originally signified, as did the Roman military term Imperator, only a commander-in-chief: it now became the title of the Supreme ruler de facto, in his double capacity of civil and military sovereign, — the King of Kings. From the accession of the Minamoto to power the history of the Shōgunate, — the long history of the military supremacy, — really begins; Japan thereafter, down to the present era of Meiji, having really two Emperors: the Heavenly Sovereign, or Daijō Incarmate, representing the

religion of the race; and the veritable
 Emperor, who wielded all the
 powers of the administration. No
 one sought to occupy by force
 the throne of the Sun's Succession,
 whence all authority was at
 least supposed to be derived.

Regent or shōgun bowed down
 before it: divinity could not
 be usurped.

~~So-called~~ Yet peace did not
 follow upon the battle of Dan-
 no-ura: the clan-wars
 incited by the great struggle
 of the Minamoto and the
 Taira, continued, at irregular
 intervals, for five centuries
 more; and the nation remained
 disintegrated. Nor did the

Minamoto long keep the supremacy which
 they had so dearly won. Deputing
 their powers to the Hōjō family, they
 were supplanted by the Hōjō, just
 as the Fujiwara had been supplanted
 by the Taira. Three only of the
 Minamoto shōgun really exercised
 rule. During the whole of the thir-
 -teenth century, and for some time
 afterwards, the Hōjō continued to
^{govern} rule the country; and it is note-
 -worthy that these ^{never} ^{reports} assumed
 the title of Shōgun, but professed
 to be merely Shōgunal deputies. Thus
 a triple-headed government appeared
 to exist; for the Minamoto kept
 up a kind of court at Kamakura,
 but they faded into mere shadows,
 and are yet remembered by the
 significant appellation of "Shadow-
 -Shōgun", or "Puppet Shōgun".

There was nothing shadowy, however, about ^{the} administration of the Hōjō, — men of immense energy and ability. By them Emperor or Shōgun could be deposed and banished without scruple; and the helplessness of the Shōgunatē can be inferred from the fact, that the seventh Hōjō regent, before deposing the seventh shōgun, sent him home in a palanquin, head-downwards and heels upwards. Nevertheless the Hōjō suffered the phantom-shōgunatē to linger on, until 1333. Though unscrupulous in their methods, these regents were capable rulers; and proved themselves able to save the country in a great emergency, — the famous invasion

attempted by Kublai Khan in 1281.
 Aided by a fortunate typhoon,
 which is said to have destroyed
 the hostile fleet in answer to
 prayer offered up at the national
 shrines, the Hōjō were able to
 repel this invasion. They were
 less successful in dealing with
 certain domestic disorders, — especially
 those fomented by the turbulent
 Buddhist priesthood. During
 the thirteenth century, Buddhism
 had developed into a great mili-
 -tary power, — strangely like
 that church-militant of the
 European middle ages: the period
 of soldier-priests and fighting-
 -bishops. The Buddhist monas-
 -teries had been converted into
 fortresses filled with men-at-arms;

Buddhist menace had more than once
 carried terror into the sacred seclusion
 of the imperial court. At an early
 day, Yoritomo, the far-seeing founder
 of the Minamoto dynasty, had
 observed a militant tendency in
 Buddhism, and had attempted to
 check it by forbidding all priests
 and monks either to bear arms,
 or to maintain armed retainers.
 But his successors had been careless
 about enforcing these prohibitions;
 and the Buddhist military power
 developed in consequence so rapidly
 that the shrewdest Hojo were
 doubtful of their ability to cope
 with it. Eventually his power
 proved capable of giving them
 serious trouble. The ninety-sixth
 Meikado, Go-Daigo, found cause

& revolt against the tyranny of the
 Itōjō ; on the Buddhist soldiers
 took part with him. He was
 promptly defeated, and banished
 to the islands of Ōki ; but his
 cause was soon espoused by pow-
 -erful lords, who had long
 chafed under the despotism of
 the regency. These assembled their
 forces, restored the banished imper-
 -or, and combined in a desperate
 attack upon the regent's capital
 , Kamakura. The city was stormed
 and burned ; and the last of
 the Itōjō rulers, after a brave
 but vain defense, performed
harakiri. Thus Shōgunate
 and regency vanished together,
 in 1333.

310
609
Lestel's

For the moment the whole power of administration had been restored to the Mikado. Unfortunately for himself and for the country, Go-Daigo was too feeble of character to avail himself of this great opportunity. He revived the dead Shōgunate by appointing his own son Shōgun; he mostly ignored the services of those whose loyalty and courage had restored him; and he foolishly strengthened the hands of those whom he had every reason to fear. As a consequence there happened the most serious political catastrophe in the history of Japan, — a division of the imperial house against its self.

The unscrupulous despotism of the Hōjō regents had prepared the possibility of such an event. During the last years of the thirteenth century, there were living at the same time in Kyōto, besides the reigning Mikado, no less than three deposed emperors. To bring about a contest for the succession was therefore an easy matter; and this was soon accomplished by the treacherous general Ashikaga Takéuji, to whom Go-Daigo had unwisely shown especial favour. Ashikaga had betrayed the Hōjō in order to help the restoration of Go-Daigo; - he

subsequently would have betrayed the trust of Go-Daigo in order to seize the administrative power. The Emperor discovered this treasonable purpose when too late, and sent against Ashikaga an army which was promptly defeated. After some further contest Ashikaga mastered the capital, drove Go-Daigo a second time into exile, set up a rival emperor, and established a new Shōgunate. Now for the first time, two branches of the Imperial family, — each supported by powerful lords, — contended for the

regard of succession. That of
 which Go-Daigo remained
 the acting representative, is
 known in history as the
 Southern Branch (Nanchō),
 and by Japanese historians
 is held to be the only legitimate
 branch. The other was called
 the Northern Branch (Hokuchō),
 and was maintained at Kyōto
 by the power of the Ashikaga
 clan; while Go-Daigo, find-
 -ing refuge in a Buddhist
 monastery, retained the insignia
 of empire... Thereafter, for
 a period of fifty-six years
 Japan continued to have two
 Mikado; and the resulting

disorder was such as to imperil
 the national integrity. It would
 have been no easy matter for
 the people to decide which
 Emperor possessed the better claim.
 At the same time the imperial presence
 had represented the national
 divinity; and the imperial
 palace had been regarded as
 the temple of the national
 religion: the division main-
 -tained by the Ashikaga
 usurpers therefore signified
 nothing less than the breaking
 up of the whole tradition upon
 which existing society had been
 built. The confusion became
 greater and greater, the danger
 increased more and more, until

The Ashikaga themselves took alarm.
 They managed then to end the
 trouble by persuading the fifth
 Mikado of the Southern Dynas-
 -ty, Go-Kaméyama, to surrender
 his insignia to the reigning
 Mikado of the Northern Dynasty,
 Go-Komatsu. This having been
 done, in 1392, Go-Kaméyama
 was honoured with the title of
 retired Emperor, and Go-Komatsu
 was nationally acknowledged as
 legitimate Emperor. But the
 names of the other four Emperors
 of the Northern dynasty are
 still excluded from the official
 list.

The Ashikaga shō-
 -gunate thus overrode the sup-

-reme peril ; but the period of
 their military domination, which
 endured until 1573, was destined
 to remain the darkest in Japanese
 history. The Ashikaga gave
 the country fifteen rulers, - several
 of whom were men of great ability ;
 they tried to encourage industry ;
 they cultivated literature and the
 arts : but they could not give
 peace. Fresh disputes arose
 ; and lords whom the shōgunate
 could not subdue made war
 upon each other. To such a
 condition of terror was the
 capital reduced that the court
 nobility fled from it to take
 refuge with daimyō powerful
 enough to afford them protec-
 -tion. Robbery became rife

throughout the land; and piracy
 terrorized the seas. The Shōgunate
 itself was ~~reduced~~ reduced to the humili-
 -ation of paying tribute to Chinese
 Agriculture an industry, at last
 ceased to exist outside of the ^{state}
 domains of certain powerful
 lords. Provinces became waste;
 and famine, earthquake, and
 pestilence added their horror
 to the misery of ceaseless war.
 The poverty prevailing may be
 best imagined from the fact
 that when the emperor known
 to history as Go-Tsuchi-mitsado
 — one hundred and second
 of the Imperial Succession — died
 in the year 1500, his corpse
 had to be kept at the gates
 of the palace forty days,

because the expenses of the funeral
 could not be defrayed. Until
 1573 the misery continued; and
 the Shōgunate meanwhile degen-
 -erated into insignificance.
 Then a strong captain arose
 and ended the house of Ashi-
 -taga, and seized the reins of
 power. This usurper was
 Oda Nobunaga; and the
 usurpation was amply pro-
 -voked. Had it not occurred,
 Japan might never have entered
 upon an era of peace.

Harrington For there had been
 no peace since the fifth century.
 No emperor or regent or shōgun
 had ever been able to impose
 his rule firmly upon the whole

country. Somewhere or other, there were always wars of clan with clan. By the time of the sixteenth century, personal safety could be found only under the protection of some military leader, able to exact his own terms for the favours of such protection. The question of the imperial succession, — which had almost wrecked the empire during the fourteenth century, — might be raised again at any time by some reckless faction, with the probable result of ruining civilization, and forcing the nation back to its primitive state of barbarism. Never did the future of Japan appear so dark as at the moment when Oda Nobunaga

suddenly found himself the strongest man in the empire, and leader of the most formidable ^{Japanese} army that had ever obeyed a single head.

This man, a descendant of Shinto priests, was above all things a patriot. He did not seek the title of Shōgun, and never received it. His hope was to save the country; and he saw that this could be done only by centralizing all feudal power under one control, and strenuously enforcing law. Looking about him for the ways and means of effecting his centralization, he perceived that one of the very first obstacles to be removed was that created by the power of Buddhism militant, — the feudal Buddhism developed

under the Hōjō regency, and especially represented by the great Shin and Tendai sects. As both had already given aid to his enemies, it was easy to find a cause for quarrel; and he first proceeded against the Tendai. The campaign was conducted with ferocious vigour; the monastery-fortresses of Hiei-san were stormed and razed, and all the priests with all their adherents put to the sword — no mercy being shown even to women and children. By nature Nobunaga was not cruel; but his policy was ruthless, and he knew when and why to strike hard. The power of the Tendai sect

before this massacre may be imagined from the fact that three thousand monastery buildings were burnt at Higei-san. The Shin sect of the Hongwanji, with head-quarters at Ōsaka, was scarcely less powerful; and its monastery, occupying the site of the present Ōsaka castle, was one of the strongest fortresses in the country. Nobunaga waited several years, merely to prepare for the attack. The soldier-priests defended themselves well; upwards of fifty thousand lives are said to have been lost in the siege; — yet only the personal intervention of the Emperor prevented the storming of the

strongholds, and the slaughter of every
 being within its walls. Through
 respect for the Emperor, Nobunaga
 agreed to spare the lives of the
 Shin priests: they were only
 dispossessed, and scattered, and
 their power forever broken. Bud-
 -dhism having been thus effectually
 crippled, Nobunaga was able
 to turn his attention to the war-
 -ring clans. Supported by
 the greatest generals that the
 nation ever produced, — Hidéyoshi
 and Iyéyasu, — he proceeded to
 enforce pacification and order;
 and his grand purpose would
 probably have been soon accom-
 -plished, but for the revengeful
 treachery of a subordinate, who
~~also~~ brought about his death in 1582.

Payne

Nobunaga, with Taira blood in his veins, had been essentially, an aristocrat, inheriting all the aptitudes of his great race for administration, and versed in all the traditions of diplomacy. His avenger and successor, Hidéyoshi, was a totally different type of soldier: a son of peasants, an undrained genius who had won his way to high command by shrewdness and courage, natural skill at arms, and immense inborn capacity for all the chess-play of war. With the great purpose of Nobunaga he had always been in sympathy; and he actually carried it out, — subduing the entire

country, from north to south, in the name of the Emperor, by whom he was appointed Regent (Kwambaku).

Thus universal peace was temporarily established. But the vast military powers which Hidéyoshi had collected and disciplined, threatened to become refractory. He found employment for them by declaring unprovoked war against Korea, whence he hoped to effect the conquest of China. The war with Korea opened in 1592, and dragged on unsatisfactorily, until 1598, when Hidéyoshi died. He had proved himself one of the greatest soldiers ever born, but not one of the best.

among rulers. Perhaps the issue of the war in Korea would have been ^{more} fortunate, if he could have ventured to conduct it himself. As a matter of fact, it merely exhausted the force of both countries; and Japan had little to show for her dearly bought victories abroad except the Mimidzuka or "Ear-Monument" at Nara, — marking the spot where thirty thousand pairs of foreign ears, cut from the pickled heads of slain, were buried in the grounds of the temple of Daibutsu...

Into the vacant place of power then stepped the most remarkable man that

Japan ever produced, — Tokugawa Iyéyasu. Iyéyasu was of Minamoto descent, and an aristocrat to the marrow of his bones. As a soldier he was scarcely inferior to Hidéyoshi, whom he once defeated, — but he was much more than a soldier: a far-sighted statesman, an incomparable diplomat, and something of a scholar. Cool, cautious, secretive, — disdusful, yet generous, — stern, yet humane, — by the range and the versatility of his genius he might be not unfavourably contrasted with Julius Cæsar. All that Nobunaga and Hidéyoshi had wished to do, and failed to do, Iyéyasu speedily accomplished.

After fulfilling Itidéyoshi's dying injunction, not to leave the troops in Korea "to become ghosts haunting a foreign land,"— that is to say, in the condition of spirits without a cult,— Iyéyasu had to face a formidable league of lords resolved to dispute his claim to rule. The terrific battle of Oshigahara left him master of the country; and he at once took measures to consolidate his power, and to perfect, even to the least detail, all the machinery of military government. To Shōgun, he reorganized the daimiōs, redistributed a majority of fiefs among those whom he could trust, created new military grades and

ordered, and so balanced the powers of the greater daimyō as to make it next to impossible for them to dare a revolt. Later on the daimyō were even required to furnish security for their good behaviour: they were obliged to pass a certain time of the year* in the Shōgun's capital, leaving their families as hostages during the rest of the year. The entire administration was readjusted upon a simple and sagacious plan; and the Laws of Iyégasu prove him to have been an excellent legislator. For the first time in Japanese history the nation was integrated, — integrated, at least, in so far as the peculiar nature of the

* The period of obligatory residence in Yedo was not the same for all daimyō. In some cases the obligation seems to have extended to six months; in others its requirement was to pass every alternate year in the capital.

social unit rendered possible. The
counsels of the founder of Yedo
were followed by his successors;
and the Tokugawa Shōgunatē,
which lasted until 1867, gave the
country fifteen military sovereigns.
Under these, Japan enjoyed both
peace and prosperity for the
time of two hundred and fifty
years; and her society was
thus enabled to evolve to the
full limit of its peculiar type.
Industries and arts developed in
new and wonderful ways; literature
found an equal patronage. The
national cult was carefully maintained
; and all precautions were taken
to prevent the occurrence of another
such contest for the imperial suc-
-cession as had nearly ruined the
country in the fourteenth century.

Suber #1 line

- We have seen that the history of military rule in Japan embraces nearly the whole period of authentic history, down to modern times, and closes with the second period of national integration.

The first period had been reached when the clans first accepted the leadership of the chief of the greatest clan, - thereafter revered as the Heavenly Sovereign, Supreme Pontiff, Supreme Arbitrator, Supreme Commander, and Supreme Magistrate. How long a time was required for this primal integration, under a patriarchal monarchy, we

cannot know; but we have learned
 that the later integration, under
 a despotism, occupied considerably
 more than a thousand years...

Now the extraordinary fact to
 note is that, during all those
 centuries, the imperial cult was
 carefully maintained by even the
 enemies of the mikado;—the
 only legitimate ruler being, in
 national belief, the Tenshi, "Son
 of Heaven",—the Tennō, "Hea-
 -venly King". Through every
 period of disorder the Offspring
 of the Sun was the object of
 national worship, and his
 palace the temple of the
 national faith. Great
 captains might coerce the
 imperial will; but they

styled themselves, none the less,
 the worshippers and slaves of
 the incarnate deity; and they
 would not more have thought of
 trying to occupy his throne, than
 they would have thought of trying
 to abolish all religion by decree.
 Once only, by the arbitrary folly
 of the Ashikaga shōguns, the
 imperial cult had been seriously
 interfered with; and the
 social earthquake consequent
 upon that division of the
 imperial house, apprised the
 usurpers of the enormity of
 their blunder... Only the
 integrity of the imperial suc-
 -cession, the uninterrupted
 maintenance of the imperial

worship, made it possible even for
 Dyéyasu to clamp together the
 indissoluble units of society.

Herbert Spencer has
 taught the student of sociology to
 recognize that religious dynasties
 have extraordinary powers of
 longevity, because they possess
 extraordinary power to resist
 change; whereas military
 dynasties, depending for their
 perpetuity upon the individual
 character of their sovereigns,
 are particularly liable to dis-
 -integration. The immense
 duration of the Japanese im-
 -perial dynasty, as contrasted
 with the history of the various
 shōgunates and regencies re-
 -presenting a merely military

domination, illustrates his teaching in a most remarkable way. Back through twenty-five hundred years we can follow the line of the imperial succession, till it vanishes out of sight into the mystery of the past. Here we have evidence of that extreme power of resisting all changes which is inherently characteristic of religious conservatism; — on the other hand, the history of every shogunate and regency proves the tendency to disintegration of institutions having no religious foundation, and therefore no religious power of cohesion. The remarkable

duration of the Fujiwara rule, as compared with others, may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the Fujiwara clan represented a religious, not a military aristocracy. Even the marvellous military structure devised by Dajin had begun to decay long before alien aggression precipitated its inevitable collapse.