# The Backward-bending Commute Times of Married Women with Household Responsibility 

Shinichiro Iwata Keiko Tamada

Working Paper No. 234
September 2008

# The backward-bending commute times of married women with household responsibility 

Shinichiro Iwata<br>Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama<br>Keiko Tamada<br>Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University

September 2008


#### Abstract

Though the existing literature provides evidence that married women choose short commutes because of low wages and household responsibilities, this theoretical paper shows that wives employed in highly paid positions also undertake short commutes and endogenously choose longer times for housework. In contrast, middle-class wives choose long commutes and undertake limited household chores. The results suggest that the commute times of wives follow a backward-bending pattern and there is a tradeoff between commute time and the hours devoted to housework in terms of wage rates. Using a sample of married women working full time from the 1993 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, we obtain empirical evidence supporting these predictions.


JEL classification: J29, J31, R23
Key words: Backward-bending commute time, household responsibilities

## 1 Introduction

In most countries, domestic chores remain the primary responsibility of many married women, even though they are often also in full-time employment. In this situation, married women will reduce their commute times in order to do housework. The monetary value assigned to time-saving in commuting is then an important factor when married women make decisions on their residential and employment locations. In this regard, this paper offers both theoretical and empirical evidence on how married women change their commute times in response to wage changes, when considering the endogeneity of housework time.

Kain (1962) empirically shows that females make shorter journeys to work than their husbands. White (1977) and Madden (1981) present theoretical location models to explain these results. Women select jobs closer to their residence because lower female earnings and shorter work hours reduce the motivation to commute. Women's heavy burden of household responsibilities also raises the cost of commuting. Gender differences in commute times are also considered by Freedman and Kern (1997), Hanson and Hanson (1980), Johnston-Anumonwo (1992), Lee and McDonald (2003), Madden and Chen Chiu (1990), Mok (2007), Singell and Lillydahl (1986), and Turner and Niemeier (1997).

Most of these studies ignore the role of women's wage rates in decisions about the location of households. If there is less spatial variation in women's wages, women have less reason to commute and their work trips become shorter. This explanation is particularly applicable to part-time workers, because they face less spatial variation in wages at low-wage levels. Full-time workers, however, encounter greater spatial variation in wages than part-time workers. Married women who work full time will simultaneously determine both their workplace and residence (Madden and Chen Chiu 1990). If wives choose higher-wage jobs, then their commute times may become as long as their husbands' (Shingell and Lillydahl 1986, Lee and McDonald 2003). However, wealthy households also tend to live closer to city centers, because the higher the wages of women, the greater the opportunity cost of commuting in lost leisure time. Furthermore, women's household responsibilities limit their willingness to commute. Therefore, households may offset the effects of long commutes by wives by locating their residences nearer to the wife's
place of employment (Freedman and Kern 1997). For instance, Mok (2007) uses a sample of fulltime workers to show that the location decisions of dual-income households are more sensitive to the wife's earnings than the husband's. This suggests the importance of considering the relation between married women's commute times and their wage rates in more detail. For this reason, this paper casts light on differences in commute times among married women working full time.

Previous studies have considered the time spent on housework as a given, and even though they argued for its impact on commute time, they were not treated as interdependent. We use a traditional labor-leisure model because it endogenously determines the time spent on housework. Solberg and Wong (1992) analyze a household model where the time use for each person is divided into market work, home production, leisure, and work-related travel time. However, the latter is treated as predetermined. In contrast to Solberg and Wong (1992), we consider a model where married women simultaneously decide their commute and housework hours.

Using this theoretical model, we find that there is a case where the effect of wives' wage rates on their commute times follows a backward-bending (inverse C-shaped) pattern. That is, married women's commute times first increase with respect to the wage rate, then decline. Increasing wages also decreases housework hours in Solberg and Wong's (1992) model. However, if we assume, as in Kohara (2000), that commute time is associated with a loss of energy to devote to housework, the housework time of married women follows a C-shaped pattern. Here we observe a tradeoff between commute time and housework time in relation to the wage rate.

Our data set, drawn from the 1993 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) conducted by the Institute for Research on Household Economics, divides time use into commuting, market work, housework, and leisure. Using a sample of married women working full time, we regress each category of time use on monthly wage rates and their squares, subject to total time restrictions. The empirical results confirm the earlier theoretical predictions. We must consider that our empirical model has a potential endogeneity problem: that is, wage rates are determined in the labor market. Singell and Lillydahl (1986) estimate a two-stage least squares model that simultaneously decides the wage rate and time use functions to control for endogeneity. This
paper uses the instrumental variables (IV) method. We again find that married women's commute times follow an inverse C-shaped pattern and that the time spent on housework is inversely related to commute time with respect to wage rates. We also find that ordinary least squares (OLS) underestimates the effect of wage rates when compared with the IV method.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical model of married women's behavior. The data and empirical model used are discussed in Section 3, along with the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper and gives directions for future research.

## 2 The model

In this model, we cast light on the influence of wage rates on the commute time of wives. We do not consider gender differences in commute time, thus the commuting decisions of husbands are degenerated outside the model. A married woman is assumed to have the following three options. The first option is that she may work and reside in the suburb. Employment opportunities are also offered in the city center. We assume that city center firms offer higher wage rates to married woman than the suburban firms. Let $\Delta w>0$ be the difference between a wage rate in the city center and the suburb, where $w$ is a wage rate. The second option is that she may undertake this opportunity and thereby work in the city center and reside in the suburb, commuting regularly to work. The third option is that she may work and reside in the city center. She chooses the option that generates the highest utility, i.e., $\max \left\{U_{1}, U_{2}, U_{3}\right\}$, where $U_{i}(i=1,2,3)$ is the utility level of the $i$-th option. In our model, commute time is given in each option as follows:

$$
t_{i}= \begin{cases}\bar{t} & (i=1,3) \\ t(w) & (i=2)\end{cases}
$$

A married women becomes a short commuter when she chooses option 1 or option 3. Otherwise, she is a long commuter. The married women chooses option 2 as a result of wage increases. Thus, the time spent on commuting in option 2 depends on wage rates, where $\Delta t / \Delta w=t_{w}>\bar{t}>0$. Because the married woman can choose only one of the three options, travel time is endogenously determined in our model. Note that the commuting time decision is a discrete choice. In addition, we implicitly assume in our model that the married woman's bargaining power in
the household increases when her wage rate increases because she can then choose residential location.

Now we consider the utility maximization problem of the $i$-th option. We present a formal model of the time allocation of married women in the manner of Gronau (1977), which assumes that time use for each person is divided into three basic activities - market work $m$, home production $h$, and leisure $l$. In this paper, however, the basic activity is extended to include the time spent on commuting, as in Solberg and Wong (1992). We also assume throughout the paper that the household consumes a single unit of housing. A woman is considered to have the following well-behaved and quasi-concave utility function:

$$
U_{i}=U(l, X),
$$

where $l$ represents leisure time and $X$ a composite good. The quantity of $X$ consumed by the married woman is given by $X=X_{m}+X_{h}$, where $X_{m}$ is goods purchased in the market and $X_{h}$ is goods produced at home. The quantity of market goods is given by:

$$
X_{m}=w m+R+I-c_{i},
$$

where $R$ is the nonlabor income of the wife, $I$ is the sum of the labor and nonlabor income of her husband, and $c_{i}$ is the housing (rental) cost. We assume that $R$ and $I$ are exogenously given. We also assume that the pecuniary commuting cost is zero. Employers often pay the pecuniary commuting cost in Japan (Yamaga 2000). The housing (rental) cost $c_{i}$ is given by:

$$
c_{i}= \begin{cases}\bar{c} & (i=1,2) \\ c(w) & (i=3)\end{cases}
$$

The housing cost is constant $\bar{c}$ when married women dwell in the suburbs. We assume that the housing cost in the city center is higher than in the suburb. A woman chooses option 3 because of the wage increase. Thus, the housing cost in option 3 depends on wage rates, where $\Delta c / \Delta w=c_{w}>\bar{c}>0$. Similarly to Kohara (2000), in our model the quantity of home goods is given by:

$$
X_{h}=A\left(t_{i}\right) F(h),
$$

where $F(\cdot)$ is the home production function and $A(\cdot)$ is a shift parameter function of productivity that depends on $t_{i}$. For all $h, F(h)$ exhibits positive and diminishing marginal products. If
$A_{t}=0$, the model is similar to Gronau (1977) and Solberg and Wong (1992). Kohara (2000), however, assumes that women who spend time commuting have less energy for housework, thus reducing their productivity, i.e., $A_{t}<0$.

The married woman faces the following two constraints: the income constraint,

$$
\begin{equation*}
X=w m+R+I-c_{i}+A\left(t_{i}\right) F(h) ; \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

and the time constraint,

$$
\begin{equation*}
T=l+h+m+t_{i}, \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $T$ is the total time available.
The first-order conditions for the maximization problem in option $i$ include the following:

$$
\begin{align*}
A\left(t_{i}\right) F_{h} & =w,  \tag{3}\\
\frac{U_{l}}{U_{X}} & =w . \tag{4}
\end{align*}
$$

In our model, the married woman chooses option 1 when she receives a low wage. She obtains a higher wage rate when she chooses options 2 or 3 . She will then choose the city center job opportunity if her utility becomes higher. To investigate this, we calculate the response of utility to a change in wage rates. By differentiating the objective function with respect to $w$ we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\Delta U_{i}}{\Delta w}=U_{l} \frac{\Delta l_{i}}{\Delta w}+U_{X} \frac{\Delta X_{i}}{\Delta w} \quad(i=2,3) . \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Suppose that $U_{x l}>0$. Consider first option 2. By totally differentiating Eqs. (1), (2), (3), and (4), we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta l_{2}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{\left(Z m-Z t_{w} w+Z t_{w} A_{t} F-1\right) A F_{h h}}{D}  \tag{6}\\
\frac{\Delta X_{2}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{\left(w-Y m+Y t_{w} w-Y t_{w} A_{t} F\right) A F_{h h}}{D}  \tag{7}\\
\frac{\Delta h_{2}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{\left(1-t_{w} A_{t} F_{h}\right)}{A F_{h h}}<0, \tag{8}
\end{align*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y & =\frac{U_{l l} U_{x}-U_{x l} U_{l}}{U_{x}^{2}}<0 \\
Z & =\frac{U_{l x} U_{x}-U_{x x} U_{l}}{U_{x}^{2}}>0 \\
D & =(Z w-Y) A F_{h h}<0
\end{aligned}
$$

Substituting Eqs. (6) and (7) into Eq. (5), and using Eq. (4), we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\Delta U_{2}}{\Delta w}=\left(m-t_{w}\left(w-A_{t} F\right)\right) . \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Eq. (9) investigates the utility level of option 2 compared with the utility level of option 1 . The wife is then more likely to choose option 2 than option 1 when her working time is long, when the additional opportunity cost of commuting is low, and when the loss of goods produced at home is small.

Next, consider option 3. By totally differentiating Eqs. (1), (2), (3), and (4), we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta l_{3}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{\left(Z m-Z c_{w}-1\right) A F_{h h}}{D}  \tag{10}\\
\frac{\Delta X_{3}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{\left(w-Y m+Y c_{w}\right) A F_{h h}}{D}  \tag{11}\\
\frac{\Delta h_{3}}{\Delta w} & =\frac{1}{A F_{h h}}<0 \tag{12}
\end{align*}
$$

Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (5), and using Eq. (4), we obtain:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\Delta U_{3}}{\Delta w}=\left(m-c_{w}\right) . \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Eq. (13) investigates the size of the utility level of option 3 compared with the utility level of option 1 . The wife is then more likely to choose option 3 than option 1 when her working time is long and the additional housing cost in the city center is low.

If $m$ is sufficiently small, and if both Eqs. (9) and (13) become negative, then the married woman resides and works in the suburb. She receives a low wage and commutes for a short time. This case is applicable to part-time workers. Because we wish to cast light on the situation of married women employed full time, we consider the case where $m$ is sufficiently large and both

Eqs. (9) and (13) become positive. The married woman then chooses options 2 or 3 when she has the opportunity of a wage increase. Comparing Eq. (9) with Eq. (13), we have:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\Delta U_{2}}{\Delta w} \gtrless \frac{\Delta U_{3}}{\Delta w} \Longleftrightarrow \frac{c_{w}}{t_{w}}+A_{t} F \gtrless w . \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Consider $A_{t}=0$. The equation is easier to understand in this case. Under $A_{t}=0$, option 2 is attractive to a married woman when the wage rate is lower than the ratio of the additional housing cost to the additional travel time. That is, for the married woman the additional housing cost is too high and the opportunity cost of travel time is sufficiently low. The married woman then commutes for a long time because she retains her residence in the suburb. Option 3 , however, is attractive to her in the reverse case. If her wage rate is high, she then feels that the additional housing cost is sufficiently low and the opportunity cost of travel time is too high. She thus transfers her residence to the city center. In sum, when the wage rate starts at a low level and then increases, she is more likely to choose a long commute time. However, when the wage starts at a high level and then increases, she is more likely to choose a short commute time. The entire schedule therefore bends backwards (inverse C-shaped) when we place the commute time on the horizontal axis and the wage rate on the vertical axis. ${ }^{1}$

Lastly, we consider the housework time of married women. We find that an increase in the wage rate reduces housework time in both Eqs. (8) and (12). When wage rates rise, it is more attractive to work in the market than at home to obtain consumer goods. If $A_{t}=0$, the reduction in housework in option 2 is equal to that in option 3. The married woman, however, further reduces her housework time in option 2 when $A_{t}<0$. That is, she is too tired to do housework because of her long commute. We may then observe that a short commuter with a higher wage (option 3) will have longer housework time than a long commuter with a lower wage (option 2) if the productivity loss in housework is sufficiently large in option 2. Because a short commuter with a lower wage in option 1 has a longer housework time than the long commuter with the higher wage in option 2, the entire schedule of housework time follows a C-shaped pattern when we place housework time on the horizontal axis and the wage rate on

[^0]the vertical axis. Therefore, we observe that the time spent on housework is inversely related to commute time with respect to wage rates.

## 3 Empirical analysis

### 3.1 Data and empirical specification

The data employed in the estimation are from the JPSC. This survey began in 1993 with interviews of 1500 women, aged 24 to 34 years. One advantage of this survey is that it includes individual wages and time allocations on weekdays, comprising commute, housework, labor, and leisure times. In the theoretical part of the paper, we assume that commute time is a discrete variable and married women have only two options: either a short or long commute. In the empirical part, however, we consider commute time as a continuous variable, because the time allocations for weekdays in the JPSC are recorded in 10-minute intervals. We also note that in the 1993 wave, individual wage rates were reported; after 1993, they were reformulated as categorical data. Accordingly, even though the JPSC provides panel data, we focus on the 1993 wave because we can use the continuous variable for wage rates to confirm our hypotheses.

The sample used in the analysis is as follows. First, we removed observations on unmarried respondents because our focus is on the commute times of married women. Second, as discussed earlier, we consider only full-time workers. In the 1993 JPSC, full-time workers reported a monthly salary. The monthly salary is suitable for considering the relation between wage rates and commute times, because the statistical variability of the monthly salary is relatively large. Third, we dropped all observations where the necessary information was not available. After screening the data in this manner, we obtained a sample of 128 observations.

Table 1 presents the definitions and Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variables: commute time, housework time, market working time, and leisure time. Table 1 also provides definitions of the independent variables used in the regression analysis. The most important variable that we focus on is wage rates. We also include a quadratic specification of wage rates, because we hypothesize that the commute time of married women follows a backward-bending pattern. Figure 1 plots data on the commute time and the monthly wage.

Initially we find that wage rates and commute times have a positive correlation. Consider Figure 1 in more detail. On the one hand, there are long commuters whose earnings are between 200,000 and 250,000 yen. On the other hand, married women who earn about 300,000 yen or more have shorter commute times than the former. Therefore, Figure 1 may reveal that commute time is negatively related to wage rate in this range.

The empirical specification is determined as follows. First, each time-use equation is estimated by OLS. ${ }^{2}$ Because the total time available for each person equals 1440 minutes ( 24 hours), the sum of the partial effects of changes in each explanatory variable (except the constant term) automatically equals zero for each set of time-use equations. This implies a tradeoff in time use. In other words, if women spend more time on some activities, then they have to reduce the time for other activities.

For the other control variables, we use the wife's nonlabor income in the previous year and the sum of her husband's labor and nonlabor income in the previous year. These variables may have an influence on the time use of married women. Researchers have used household characteristics as proxies for the degree of household responsibility to test the household responsibility hypothesis (HRH). Similarly to previous research, we include the number of children younger than seven years (child $0-6$ ) and the number of children aged $7-12$ years (child $7-12$ ). If working mothers have the greater share of childcare in the household, these variables decrease commute time with an increase in the time spent on housework.

Lee and McDonald (2003) also include the presence in the household of parents or parents-in-law who are older than 59 years. They assume that living with parents or parents-in-law may reduce the household responsibilities of married women because they help with childcare, housecleaning, meal preparation, etc. In fact, Lee and McDonald (2003) find that this variable increases their commute time. Ueda (2005) also include the presence in the household of the wife's or husband's mother at an age of 64 years or younger. However, this estimates a housework time equation, not the commute time equation. In the explanatory variables, Ueda (2005) also includes the presence in the household of other parents, arguing that living with other parents

[^1]may actually increase housework time in taking care of them, e.g., assisting them to eat or use the bathroom. In this paper, we include the presence in the household of the parents or parents-in-law at an age of 64 years or younger (parents), the presence in the household of parents or parents-in-law who are older than 64 years (parents 65), and the presence in the household of the wife's or husband's grandparents (grandparent). Lastly, three geographical categories are included, comprising 13 major cities in Japan (large city), all other cities (middle city), and towns and villages (small city).

We estimate each time-use equation using the IV method. IV will overcome a potential endogeneity problem: wage rates are determined in the labor market. ${ }^{3}$ We use dummy variables for the number of employees, the wife's occupation, and the industry of employment as instruments for wage rates. Table 1 provides detailed information on these variables. We also include the wife's age, tenure in the current job, and tenure squared as instruments. ${ }^{4}$

### 3.2 Estimation results

Table 3 provides the OLS estimation results, and Table 4 details the IV estimation results. ${ }^{5}$ Although Table 4 shows that the Cragg-Donald $F$-statistic is smaller than the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values, the IV method reduces the negative bias of wage rates in the OLS estimation, as explained below. Before discussing the effect of wage rates on the time-use equations, we briefly refer to another control variable. From both Tables 3 and 4, we find that having a child aged $0-6$ has a significant effect on the time allocation of married women. As the number of preschool-age children increases, greater household responsibilities result in shorter commute times and longer work times at home. These findings are intuitive but important. The literature (Madden 1981, Lee and McDonald 2003, Turner and Niemeier 1997) has shown that married women's commuting is influenced by the presence of children because of household responsibilities. However, they do not confirm whether the presence of children increases housework time because their data does not include housework time. In contrast, the

[^2]linkage between commuting time, housework time, and the presence of children in our study is clear. We also find that preschool-age children decrease married women's working time in the market. No other variables related to HRH have any effect on the time-use equations. Both the wives' unearned income and the husbands' income also have insignificant effects on time allocation. The middle city dummies are all insignificant. The OLS and IV results show that small city dummies have a significant impact on housework time. Married women who reside in a small city have shorter housework times than those who reside in a large city.

Our estimation results in Tables 3 and 4 obtain a backward-bending labor supply curve. However, the coefficient for wage squared in Table 3 is insignificant, whereas that in Table 4 is significant. The results suggest the importance of controlling for wage rates using the IV method. The sign of wage rates and their squares on the time spent on commuting and housework are important for our argument. As expected, the wage rate has a significant and positive impact and the square of the wage rate has a significant and negative impact on commute time. ${ }^{6}$ Therefore, the estimation result shows that the commute time of married women follows a backwardbending pattern with respect to their wage rates. In contrast, an increase in wages decreases married women's home production times at an increasing rate. This implies that housework time follows a C-shaped pattern. Combining these results shows that married women with either low or high wage rates locate their residences near their job locations and have long housework times. On the other hand, married women with wage rates between these extremes choose longer commutes because they do not have sufficient wages to move to the new location. As a result, their housework times become shorter.

Comparing Table 3 with Table 4 shows that the absolute estimated value of wage and wage squared in Table 4 is larger than in Table 3. This suggests that OLS underestimates the effect of the wage rate on the time-use allocation compared with the IV method. Figure 2 shows the relationship between commuting time and wage rates for married women who reside in a large city with a child. We also set that they have no unearned income but that their husband has the average total income. The empirical result using IV shows that commute time peaks at

[^3]approximately 250,000 yen, while OLS results provide a peak at about 350,000 yen.
Using the IV results, Figure 3 shows the portion of daytime hours devoted to commuting, housework, market work, and leisure. Once again, commute time first increases, and then decreases, with respect to wage rates. When the married women earns a low wage $(100,000$ yen), the fraction of time spent on housework is $22.5 \%$. This drops until 250,000 yen, before increasing again.

## 4 Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the commute times of married women with household responsibilities and their wage rates. The analysis differs from previous work because the times spent on commuting and housework are simultaneously determined in both the theoretical and empirical models.

Previous research emphasizes that married women tend to have short commutes because of low wages and high household responsibilities. In the theoretical part of the paper, however, we show that there is a case where wives' commute times follow a backward-bending pattern with respect to wage rates. We also show a tradeoff between commute time and housework time in relation to wage rates. Married women with lower-wage jobs choose short commutes and have longer housework times. Because higher wage rates offset the effects of a long commute, wives will choose a long commute when offered higher-wage jobs. In this case, their housework time decreases because it is more efficient to work in the market than at home. Married women further reduce their housework times in this case because a long time spent commuting reduces energy for housework. However, married women with even higher-wage jobs also choose short commutes. This is because they move to closer to their workplaces: with a higher wage rate, there is a higher opportunity cost of commuting. In this case, they save time to do domestic chores. Empirical results using OLS and IV and a sample of married women working full time from the 1993 JPSC support our theoretical predictions. The results also support the HRH for the number of small children. That is to say, as in previous studies, the number of preschool-age children reduces wives' commute times and substantially increases their housework times.

We note several other considerations in the paper. First, in our study the behavior of husbands is a black box. In the theoretical part, we implicitly assume that married women's bargaining power in a household increases when their wage rates increase. The effect of this bargaining power would be better captured if we constructed a bargaining model. Our empirical results also show that relatively high-wage earners can engage in long housework times and have short commutes. This suggests that while Japanese husbands do not help with domestic duties, they may still have a role in determining the location of the family residence. We could confirm this if we included information on husbands. Second, we do not draw any policy implications because neither the theoretical model nor the empirical model includes any policy parameters. As mentioned in the theoretical part, Japanese firms and government offices often reimburse employees for the cost of commuting. This is because commuting costs are tax deductible in the Japanese tax system (Yamaga 2000). In this tax system, the decisions of wives will be distorted towards long commutes (option 2 in our theoretical model). As a result, their housework times will decline. This policy context is left for future research. Third, as mentioned in the empirical section, we do not use panel data, even though it is available. However, panel data is more suitable for understanding dynamic decisions regarding workplaces and residences. To address this, we will use the panel data in our future research.

## Acknowledgment

We would like to thank, Xu Guangjian, Wang Hongwei, Mari Kan, Shigeki Kano, Wataru Kureishi, Hyun-Hoon Lee, Colin McKenzie, Kei Sakata, Shizuka Sekita, Chan-Hyuun Sohn, Midori Wakabayasi, Sun-Tien Wu, Liu Xin, Keiko Yoshida, and seminar participants at Renmin University of China, and AsRES conference in Shanghai for their valuable comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the Institute for Research on Household Economics for access to microdata of the JPSC. Part of this paper was written while Shinichiro Iwata was visiting CIRJE, University of Tokyo. He is grateful for its hospitality. This research was supported by KAKENHI 19330062 and 19730170.

## References

Freedman, O., \& Kern, C. R. (1997). A model of workplace and residence choice in two-worker households, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27, 241-260.

Gronau, R. (1977). Leisure, home production, and work-The theory of the allocation of time revisited, Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1099-1123.

Hanson, S., \& Hanson, P. (1980) Gender and urban activity patterns in Uppsala, Sweden, Geographical Review, 70, 291-299.

Johnston-Anumonwo, I. (1992). The influence of household type on gender differences in work trip distance, Professional Geographer, 44, 161-169.

Kain, J. F. (1962). The journey-to-work as a determinant of residential location, Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 9, 137-160.

Kohara, M. (2000). Market and home labor supply and long commuting time: Do husbands with short commuting times help more at home? The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, 476, 35-45. [In Japanese]

Lee, B. S., \& McDonald, J. F. (2003). Determinants of commuting time and distance for Seoul residents: The impact of family status on the commuting of women, Urban Studies, 40, 1283-1302.

Madden, J. F. (1981). Why women work closer to home. Urban Studies, 18, 181-194.

Madden, J. F., \& Chen Chiu, L. (1990). The wage effects of residential location and commuting constraints on employed married women, Urban Studies, 27, 353-369.

Mok, D. (2007). Do two-earner households base their choice of residential location on both incomes? Urban Studies, 44, 723-750.

Singell, L. D., \& Lillydahl, J. H. (1986). An empirical analysis of the commute to work patterns of males and females in two-earner households. Urban Studies, 23, 119-129.

Solberg, E. J., \& Wong, D. C. (1992). Family time use: Leisure, home production, market work, and work-related travel, Journal of Human Resources, 27, 485-510.

Turner, T., \& Niemeier, D. (1997). Travel to work and household responsibility: New evidence, Transportation, 24, 397-419.

Ueda, A (2005). Intrafamily time allocation of housework: Evidence from Japan, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 19, 1-23.

White, M. J. (1977). A model of residential location choice and commuting by men and women workers, Journal of Regional Science, 17, 41-52.

Yamaga, H. (2000). The impacts of fare reimbursement and congestion charge on housing rent: The case of a commuter train line in Tokyo, Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies, 12, 200-211

Table 1

| Definition of variables |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Variable | Definition |
| Commute | Commute time, minutes. |
| Housework | Housework time, minutes. |
| Market | Market work time, minutes. |
| Leisure | Leisure time, minutes. Various subtime categories, e.g., studying, sleeping, eating, are aggregated into leisure time. |
| Wage | Monthly salary rate, yen. |
| Wage squared | Square of monthly salary divided by 10,000. |
| Unearned income | 1992 nonlabor income, 1992 10,000 yen. |
| Husband's income | 1992 husband's total income, 1992 10,000 yen. |
| Child 0-6 | The number of children aged 0-6. |
| Child 7-12 | The number of children aged 7-12. |
| Parents | Dummy variable for living with parents or parents-in-law aged 64 years or younger. |
| Parents 65 | Dummy variable for living with parents or parents-in-law aged 65 years or older. |
| Grandparent | Dummy variable for living with grandparents. |
| Large city | Dummy variable for having a residence in a large city (reference). |
| Middle city | Dummy variable for having a residence in a middle city. |
| Small city | Dummy variable for having a residence in a small city. |
| Emp. 1 | Dummy variable for 1-99 employees (reference). |
| Emp. 2 | Dummy variable for 100-499 employees. |
| Emp. 3 | Dummy variable for 500-999 employees. |
| Emp. 4 | Dummy variable for 1000 or more employees. The number of employees in government and municipal offices is included in this category. |
| Professional | Dummy variable for a respondent who is a professional worker. |
| Technical | Dummy variable for a respondent who is a technical worker. |
| Other occ. | Dummy variable for a respondent who works in another occupation (reference). |
| Fin. and pub. | Dummy variable for a respondent who works in a finance company or the public service. |
| Others ind. | Dummy variable for a respondent who works in another industry (reference). |
| Age | Age of the respondent, years. |
| Tenure | Tenure of current job, years. |
| Tenure squared | Square of tenure of current job. |

Table 2
Summary statistics

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Commute | 50.63 | 49.81 | 0 | 280 |
| Housework | 224.69 | 136.72 | 0 | 780 |
| Market | 495.39 | 77.16 | 60 | 660 |
| Leisure | 669.30 | 112.15 | 360 | 1030 |
| Wage | 201.16 | 75.29 | 50 | 500 |
| Wage squared | 460.88 | 360.33 | 25 | 2500 |
| Unearned income | 2.33 | 15.61 | 0 | 150 |
| Husband's income | 439.38 | 147.65 | 140 | 1000 |
| Child 0-6 | 0.86 | 0.88 | 0 | 3 |
| Child 7-12 | 0.38 | 0.64 | 0 | 2 |
| Parents | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Parents 65 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Grandparent | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Large city | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 |
| Middle city | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Small city | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Emp. 1 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Emp. 2 | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| Emp. 3 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Emp. 4 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Professional | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Technical | 0.16 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Other occ. | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Fin. and pub. | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Others ind. | 0.86 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 30.09 | 3.10 | 24 | 34 |
| Tenure | 6.16 | 3.97 | 0 | 16 |
| Tenure squared | 53.60 | 55.40 | 0 | 256 |
| Observations |  | 128 |  |  |

Wage squared is divided by 100 .

Table 3
OLS estimation

| Variable | Commute |  | Housework |  | Market |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coeff. | Std. Err. | Coeff. | Std. Err. | Coeff. | Std. Err. |
| Wage | $0.5821^{* * *}$ | 0.1693 | $-1.5571 * *$ | 0.7111 | 1.0273** | 0.4964 |
| Wage squared | $-0.0008^{* *}$ | 0.0003 | 0.0028** | 0.0014 | -0.0015 | 0.0009 |
| Unearned income | -0.1356 | 0.1256 | 0.0633 | 0.4300 | -0.2616 | 0.3401 |
| Husband's income | 0.0242 | 0.0359 | -0.0794 | 0.0838 | -0.0631 | 0.0522 |
| Child 0-6 | $-9.5725^{* *}$ | 4.5259 | $87.8656^{* *}$ | 13.7797 | $-22.0667^{* *}$ | 10.4753 |
| Child 7-12 | -0.5265 | 6.8676 | -21.6006 | 15.5577 | 8.1604 | 9.8008 |
| Parents | -6.2840 | 9.0969 | 1.1604 | 20.5596 | -9.4439 | 11.6558 |
| Parents 65 | -11.0340 | 12.1971 | 15.1700 | 27.6631 | 25.1923* | 14.5205 |
| Grandparent | -10.5952 | 10.8732 | -11.5327 | 27.2139 | 3.9713 | 13.3152 |
| Middle city | -10.0329 | 14.7601 | 8.1506 | 22.9800 | -18.5007 | 16.2797 |
| Small city | -23.8530 | 14.4365 | $-60.4679^{* *}$ | 28.0571 | 10.8423 | 17.9324 |
| Const. | -13.6534 | 33.1090 | $391.1080^{* * *}$ | 104.3062 | 407.5050*** | 63.9540 |
| Adj-R ${ }^{2}$ | 0.2778 |  | 0.3882 |  | 0.3114 |  |
| Observations | 128 |  | 128 |  | 128 |  |

Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
*** indicates significant at $1 \%$.
** indicates significant at $5 \%$.

* indicates significant at $10 \%$.

Table 4
IV estimation

| Variable | Commute |  | Housework |  | Market |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coeff. | Std. Err. | Coeff. | Std. Err. | Coeff. | Std. Err. |
| Wage | $1.1290 * *$ | 0.5083 | -2.2232* | 1.1634 | $1.7975^{* * *}$ | 0.6762 |
| Wage squared | -0.0021* | 0.0011 | $0.0043^{*}$ | 0.0026 | $-0.0032^{* *}$ | 0.0015 |
| Unearned income | -0.1316 | 0.1447 | 0.0779 | 0.4628 | -0.2144 | 0.3601 |
| Husband's income | 0.0419 | 0.0335 | -0.1041 | 0.0887 | -0.0449 | 0.0583 |
| Child 0-6 | $-9.0748^{* *}$ | 4.5610 | $87.4667^{* * *}$ | 12.4630 | $-20.9246^{* *}$ | 8.6547 |
| Child 7-12 | -0.1982 | 6.6802 | -22.0423 | 15.3410 | 8.5337 | 9.6936 |
| Parents | -9.7027 | 8.0865 | 5.7089 | 19.8580 | -13.4397 | 11.6732 |
| Parents 65 | -12.9638 | 11.3328 | 17.5603 | 25.9094 | 22.5593 | 14.2868 |
| Grandparent | -11.6638 | 11.2455 | -10.6510 | 26.6602 | 1.5729 | 13.9821 |
| Middle city | -9.8786 | 14.3764 | 9.2778 | 24.8479 | -15.4837 | 16.6575 |
| Small city | -21.5503 | 14.4443 | $-62.8158^{* *}$ | 28.1083 | 15.0575 | 18.8155 |
| Const. | -72.7057 | 54.5802 | $460.9202^{* * *}$ | 140.8516 | 319.8450 *** | 74.4546 |
| Centered $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.2200 |  | 0.3755 |  | 0.2710 |  |
| Observations | 128 |  | 128 |  | 128 |  |

Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
(Cragg-Donald Wald $F$ statistic) $1.91<10.43$ (Stock-Yogo weak ID test $10 \%$ critical values)
*** indicates significant at $1 \%$.
** indicates significant at $5 \%$.

* indicates significant at $10 \%$.


## Appendix

Table 5
Wage and wage squared estimation

| Variable | Wage |  | Wage squared |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Coeff. | Std.Err. | Coeff. | Std. Err. |
| Unearned income | $-0.7845^{* *}$ | 0.2390 | $-0.3893^{* * *}$ | 0.1473 |
| Husband's income | 0.0737 | 0.0474 | 0.0391* | 0.0203 |
| Child 0-6 | $-16.9732^{* *}$ | 6.5734 | $-7.4221^{* *}$ | 3.0275 |
| Child 7-12 | 9.0298 | 8.6241 | 4.0782 | 3.7597 |
| Parents | -16.4509 | 11.4033 | -9.3653* | 5.5138 |
| Parents 65 | 7.9293 | 16.4207 | 3.2671 | 7.5638 |
| Grandparent | 20.9679 | 18.1974 | 8.3183 | 8.1048 |
| Middle city | $-38.7207^{* *}$ | 16.5592 | $-15.3712^{*}$ | 8.1188 |
| Small city | -27.3807 | 22.1833 | -9.5967 | 12.1030 |
| Emp. 2 | 9.2300 | 14.1856 | 0.2000 | 5.9522 |
| Emp. 3 | 60.6924* | 34.9957 | 31.2015 | 19.7711 |
| Emp. 4 | 20.0088 | 13.1696 | 4.4973 | 6.3871 |
| Professional | $45.2951{ }^{* * *}$ | 14.7572 | $16.2659^{* *}$ | 6.5760 |
| Technical | $63.6022^{* * *}$ | 15.4821 | $26.8465^{* * *}$ | 7.8466 |
| Fin. and pub. | $62.3157^{* *}$ | 23.9369 | $34.1575^{* *}$ | 13.8356 |
| Age | 1.1605 | 2.1400 | 1.0801 | 1.0670 |
| Tenure | 8.4972 | 5.3757 | 4.8979* | 2.8865 |
| Tenure squared | -0.3805 | 0.4116 | -0.2818 | 0.2297 |
| Const. | 108.5934* | 62.7480 | -14.1246 | 33.2427 |
| Centered R ${ }^{2}$ | 0.4374 |  | 0.3990 |  |
| Observations | 128 |  | 128 |  |

Std. Err. represents robust standard errors.
Wage squared is divided by 1000 .
*** indicates significant at $1 \%$.
** indicates significant at $5 \%$.

* indicates significant at $10 \%$.


Figure 1. Commute times and wage rates of married women


Figure 2. The backward-bending commute times of married women


Figure 3. Time allocation


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Placing the wage rate on the vertical axis is customary in economics. Of course, the entire schedule becomes inverse U-shaped when we place the wage rate on the horizontal axis.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Solberg and Wong (1992) use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to estimate the time-use equations. Unfortunately, we cannot use SUR because the covariance matrix of the errors is singular.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ The other consideration is that our empirical model has a potential measurement error problem in that respondents do not always accurately report their wage rates. The IV method also solves this problem.
    ${ }^{4}$ The estimation results for the wage rate and its square are reported in the Appendix.
    ${ }^{5}$ We do not report the estimation results of the time spent in leisure, the remainder of Eq. (2), because we can calculate the coefficient of leisure by using the value of the estimated coefficients from other equations.

[^3]:    ${ }^{6}$ Figure 1 reveals that there are only two respondents who earn more than 400,000 yen and only one respondent who commutes more than 250 minutes. The OLS and IV estimation results both support the hypothesis of a backward-bending commute time even when we drop these three observations.

