Survivors.
In the gardens of certain Buddhist temples there are trees which have been famous for centuries, trees trained and clipped into extraordinary shapes. Some have the form of dragons; others have the form of pagodas, ships, umbrellas. Supposing that one of these trees were abandoned to its own natural tendencies, it would eventually lose the peculiar shape so long imposed upon it; but the outline would not be altered for a considerable time, as the new lenticels would at first
unfold only in the direction of least resistance: that is, say within limits originally established by the shears and the pruning-knife. By sword and lance the old Japanese Sociey had been pruned and clipped, bent and bound, just like such a tree; and after the reconstructing of the Meiji period,—after the abolition of the daimioles, and the suppression of the military class,—it still maintains its former shape, just as the tree would continue to do when first abandoned by the gardener. Though delivered from the bonds of feudal law, released from the shears of military rule, the great bulk of the social structure preserved its ancient aspect; and the rare spectacle bewildered and delighted the Western
observation. Here indeed was Elfland—a strange, the beautiful, the grotesque, the very mysterious—totally unlike any part of strange and attractive ever beheld elsewhere. It was not a world of the nine-
decent century after Christ, but a world of many centuries before Christ: yet this fact—the wonder of wonders—remained unrecognized; and it remains unrecognized by most people even to this day.

Fortunate indeed were those privileged to rule this astonishing, fairyland thirty odd years ago, before the period of superficial change, and to observe the unfamiliar aspects of its life: the universal urbanity, the smiling silence of crowds, the patient deliberation of toil, the absence of minter, and struggle.
Even yet, in these remoter districts where alien influence has wrought but little change, the charm of the old existence lingers and amazes; and the ordinary traveller can little understand what it means. That all are polite, that nobody quarrels, that every body smiles, that pain and sorrow remain invisible, that the new police have nothing to do, would seem to prove a morally superior humanity. But for the trained sociologist it would prove something different, and suggest something very terrible. It would prove to him that this society had been moulded under immense coercion, and that the coercion must have been exerted uninterruptedly for thousands of years. He would immediately perceive that ethics and custom had not
yet become dissociated, and that the conduct of each person was regulated by the will of the rest. He would know that personality could not develop in such a social medium; that no individual superiority dare assert itself, that no competition would be tolerated. He would understand that the outward charm of his life, — its softness, its smiling silence as of dreams, — signifies the rule of the dead. He would recognize that between these minds and the minds of his own epoch no kinship of thought, no common sentiment, no sympathy whatever could exist, — that the separating gulf was not to be measured by thousands of leagues, but only by thousands of years, — that the psychological interval was hopeless as the distance from
planet to planet. Yet this knowledge probably would not—certainly should not—blind him to the intrinsic charm of things. Nor to feel the beauty of this archaic life is to prove oneself insensitive to all beauty. Even that Greek word, for which our scholars and poets profess such loving admiration, must have been in many ways a word of the same kind, whose daily mental existence no modern mind could share.
Now that the great social tree, so wondrously clipped and cared for twenty centuries, or more, is losing its outward shape, let us try to see how much of the original design can still be traced.

Under all the outward aspects of individual activity that modern Japan presents to the visitor's gaze, the ancient conditions really persist to an extent that no observation could reveal. While the immemorial cult rules all the land, while the family law, the communal law, and (though in a more irregular manner) the clan-laws control every action...
of existence. I do not refer to any written law, but only to the old unwritten religious law, with its host of obligations deriving from ancestor worship.

It is true that many changes—and, in the opinion of the wise, too many changes—have been made in civil legislation; but the ancient proverb, "Government laws are but seven-day laws," still represents popular sentiment in regard to hastily-reformed laws. The old law, the law of the dead, is that by which the millions prefer to act and drink. Though ancient social groupings have been officially abolished, re-groupings of a corresponding sort have been formed, instructively, throughout the country districts. In theory the individual is free; in practice
he is scarcely more free than were his forefathers. Old penalties for breach of custom have been abro-
gaged; yet communal opinion is able to compel the ancient obedience. Legal enactment can nowhere affect immediate change of sentiment and long-established usage, least of all among a people of such fixed character as the Japanese. Young persons are no more at liberty now than were their fathers as members under the Dojimate, to marry as will, to invest their means and effort in undertakings sanctioned by family approval, to consider themselves in any way enfranchised from family authority.
— and it is probably better for the present that they are not. No man is yet complete master of his activities, his ends, or his means. Though the individual is now registered and made directly accountable to the law, while the household has been relieved from its ancient responsibility for the acts of its members, still the family, practically remains the social unit, retaining its patriarchal organization and its particular cult. Not unwise, the modern legislator have protected this domestic religion: to weaken its bond at this time were to weaken the foundations of the national moral life, to introduce disintegrations in the most deeply-seated structure.
of the social organism. The new code 
forbid the man, who becomes by succession 
the head of a house, 2 abolish that 
house: he is not permitted to 
suppress a child. No legal pre-
sumptive heir to the headship 
of a family can enter into 
another family as adopted son 
or husband; nor can he 
abandon his own family in order 
to establish an independent 
family of his own. Provision 
had been made to meet extraor-
dinary cases; but no individual 
is allowed, without good and 
sufficient reason, to free himself 
from those traditional obligations 
which the family cult imposes. 
As regards adoption, the new 
law maintains the spirit of 
the old, with fresh provision
* That is to say, he cannot separate himself from the family in law, but he is free to live in a separate home. The tendency is further illustrated by the fact that the family is shown by a custom which has been growing in late years, especially in Tokyo: the custom of demanding, as a condition of marriage, that the bride shall not be obliged to live in the same house with the parents of the bridegroom. This custom is yet confined to certain classes, and has been adversely criticized. Many young men, on marrying, leave the parental home to begin independent housekeeping, though remaining legally attached to their parents' family, of course... So will be asked, What becomes of the cult in such cases? The cult remains in the parental home. When the parents die, then the ancestral tablets are transferred to the home of the married son.
for the conservation of the family, religion, — permitting any person of legal age to adopt a son, on the simple condition that the person adopted shall be younger than the adopted. The new divorce-laws do not permit the dismissal of a wife for sterility alone (and divorce for such cause had long been condemned by Japanese sentiment); but, in view of the facilities given for adoption, this reform does not endanger the continuance of the cult.

An interesting example of the manner in which the law still protects ancestor-worship is furnished by the fact that an aged and childless widow, last representative of her family, is not permitted to remain without...
an heir. She must adopt a son if she can: if she cannot, because of poverty, or for other reasons, the local authorities will provide a son for her—
that is to say, a male heir to maintain the family worship.
Such officials in difference would seem to be tyrannical: it is simply paternal, and represents the continuance of an ancient regulation intended to protect the bereaved against what Eastern faith still deems the supreme misfortune,—the ex-
clusion of the home-cult...
In other respects the labor codes allow of individual liberty unknown in previous generations. But in ordinary
person were not dream of attempting to claim a legal right opposed to common opinion. Family and public sentiment are still more potent than law. The Japanese newspapers frequently record tragic results from the prevention or dissolution of unions; and these tragedies afford strong proof that most young people would prefer even suicide to the probable consequences of a successful appeal to law against family decision.
The communal form of coercion is less apparent in the large cities; but everywhere it endures to some extent, and in the agricultural districts it remains supreme. Between the new conditions and the old there is this difference, that the man who finds the yoke of his district hard to bear can flee from it; he could not do so fifty years ago. But he can flee from it only to enter into another state of subordination of nearly the same kind. Full advantage nevertheless has been taken of this modern liberty of movement: thousands yearly throng to the cities; other thousands travel...
over the country, from province to province; working for a year or a season in one place, then going to another, with little more I hope for than experience of change.

Emigration also has been taking place upon an extensive scale; but for the common class of migrants, at least, the advantage of emigration is chiefly represented by the chance of earning larger wages. A Japanese emigrant community abroad organizes itself upon the home-plan*; and the individual

* Except as regards the communal cult, perhaps. The domestic cult is complicated; - emigrants, who go abroad accompanied by Néi Néi-shū, take the ancestral tablet with them. To what extent the communal cult may have been established in emigrant communities, I have not yet been able to learn. It would appear, however, that the absence of Ujigami in certain emigrant settlements, to be accounted for solely by the pecuniary difficulties of constructing such temples and maintaining competent officiants, in Formosa, for example, though the domestic officiant

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emigrant probably finds himself as much under communal coercion in Canada, Hawaii, or the Philippine Islands, as he could ever have been in his native province. Needless to say, that in foreign countries such coercion is more than compensated by the aid and protection given by the communal organization, as it ensures. But with the constantly increasing number of restless spirits at home, and the ever-widening experience of Japanese emigrants abroad, it would seem likely that the power of the commune for com-

- pulsion cooperation must be weakened in the near future.
As for the tribal or clan law, it survives to the degree of remaining almost omnipotent in administrative circles, and in all politics. Voters, officials, legislators, do not follow principles in our sense of the word: they follow men, and obey commands. In these spheres of action the penalties of dis obedience or orders are endless as well as serious: by a single such offence one may array against oneself powers that will continue their hostile operation for years and years, — unreasonably, in placidity, blindly, with the weight and persistence of natural forces, — of winds or tides.

Any comprehension of the history of Japanese politics during the last fifteen years is not possible without some knowledge of clan-history.
A political leader, fully acquainted with the history of clan-parties, and their offshoots, can accomplish marvellous things; and even foreign adventurers, with long experience of Japanese life, have been able by chess-playing with clan-interest, to exercise a very real power in government circles. But to the ordinary foreigner, Japanese customs temporarily, politics must appear a chaos, a disintegration, a hopeless flux. The truth is that most things remain, under varying outward forms, "as all were ordered, ages since," though the shifting have become more rapid, and the results less obvious, in the haste of an era of steam and electricity.

The greatest of living
Japanese shōguns, the Marquis Ito, long ago perceived that the tendency of political life to agglomeration, to clan-groupings, presented the most serious obstacle to the successful working of constitutional government. He understood that this tendency could be opposed only by considerations weighing down clan-interests, considerations worthy of supreme sacrifice. He therefore formed a party of which every member was pledged to pass over clan-interests, clique-interests, personal and every other kind of interests, for the sake of national interests. Brought into collision with a hostile cabinet in 1903, this party achieved the feat of con-
Rolling up, aminocëtes even to the extent of maintaining its foes in power, but large fragments broke off in the process. To profoundly is the growing tendency, the clan-sentiment, identified with national character, that the ultimate success of Marcé's policy must still be considered doubtful. Only a material danger, the danger of war, has yet been able to weld all parties together, to make all wills work as one.

Not only politics, but nearly all phases of modern life, yield evidence that the disintegration of the old society has been superficial rather than fundamental. Structures dissolved have recrystallized, taking forms
discimilar in aspect to the original forms, but inwards built upon the same plan. For the disso-

lutions really affect bi represented only a separation of masses, not a breaking up of substance into independ ent units; and these masses, again cohering, continue to act only as masses. Inde-

pendence of personal action, in the Western sense, is still al-

most inconceivable. The individual of every class above the lowest must continue to be at once coerced and coerced. Like an atom within a solid body, he can vibrate; but the orbit of his vibration is fixed. He must act and be acted upon in ways differing little from those of an e轶nt human.

# Zlar
As for being acted upon, the average man is under three kinds of pressure: — pressure from above, exemplified in the will of his superior; — pressure about him, represented by the common will of his fellows and equals; — pressure from below, represented by the general sentiment of his inferior. And his last sort of coercion is not the least formidable.

Individual resistance is the first kind of pressure; but resistance by an individual is not even to be thought of; because the superior represents a clan, a class, an exceeding multiple power of some description; and no solitary individual, in the present order of
Dhuge, can strive against a combina-

To resist injustice he

ciud show an ample support, in

which case his resistance does
not represent individual action.

Resistance is the second
kind of pressure - communal
coercion - signifies ruin, loss
of the sign of form a part
of the social body.

Resistance is the third
sort of pressure, embodied in the
common sentiment of superiors, may
result in almost anything - from
momentary annoyance to sudden
death - according to circum-
stances.

In all forms of society
these three kinds of pressure are
exerted to some degree; but
in Japanese society, owing
inherited tendency, and traditional sentiment, their power is tremendous.

Thus, in every direction, the individual finds himself confronted by the despotism of collective opinion; it is impossible for him to act with safety except as one unit of a combination.

The first kind of pressure deprives him of moral freedom, exactly unlimited obedience to orders; the second kind of pressure denies him the right to use his best faculties in the best way for his own advantage (that is, denies him the right of free competition); the third kind of pressure compels him, in directly the actions of others, to follow tradition, to forbear innovation.
To avoid making any changes, however beneficial, which do not find willing acceptance on the part of the inferior.

These are the social conditions which, under normal circumstances, make for stability, for conservation; and they represent the will of the dead. They are inevitable in a militant state; they make the strength of that state; they render facile the creation and maintenance of formidable armies. But they are not conditions favourable to success in the future international competition, in the industrial struggle, for evidence against societies, in particular more plastic, and of higher mental energy.