The Rise of the Military Power.
The whole of authentic Japanese history is comprised in one vast episode: the rise and fall of the military power... It has been customary to speak of Japanese history as beginning with the accession of Jimmu Tenno, alleged to have reigned from 660 to 585 B.C., and to have lived for one hundred and twenty-seven years. Before the time of the Emperor Jimmu was the Age of the Gods, — the period of my mythology. But this work, in history does not begin for a hundred years after the accession of Jimmu Tenno; on...
The chronicles of more thousand years must be regarded as little better than fairy-tales. They contain records of fact; but fact and myth are so interwoven that it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. We have legends, for example, of an alleged conquest of Korea in the year 202 A.D., by the Empress Jingō; and it has been tolerably well proved that no such conquest took place. The later records are somewhat less mythical than the earlier. We have traditions, apparently founded on fact, of Korean immigration in the time of the fifteenth ruler, the

Emperor Tjinn; - then later historians, also founded on fact, of early Chinese studios in Japan; - then some vague accounts of a disturbed state of society, which appears to have continued through the whole of the fifth century. Buddhism was introduced in the middle of the century following; and we have records of the fierce opposition offered to the new creed by a Shinto faction, and of a miraculous victory won by the help of the Four Deva Kyo, at the prayer of Dhódon Toishi, - the great founder of Buddhism, and regent of the Empress Shitō. With the firm establishment of Buddhism in the reign of that Empress
(593-628 A.D.) we reach the period of authentic history, and of the third Japanese sovereign—country from Jimmu Tenno.

But although every thing prior to the seventh century remains obscure for us by the mist of fable, much can be inferred, even from the half-mythical records, concerning social conditions during the reigns of the first thirty-three Emperors and Empresses. It appears that the early Mikado lived very simply—scarcely better, indeed, than their subjects. The Chinkō scholar Mabuchi tells us that they dwelt in huts with mud walls and roofs of shingle; that they
wore hempen clothes; but they carried their swords in simple wooden scabbards, bound round with the stalk of a wild rice; that they walked about freely among the people; that they carried their own bows and arrows when they went to hunt. But as society developed wealth and power, this early simplicity disappeared; and the gradual introduction of Chinese customs and etiquette effected great changes. The Empress Dowager Ch'ing introduced Chinese court ceremonies, and first established among the nobility the Chinese grades of rank. Chinese luxury, as well as Chinese learning, soon made its appearance at court; and thereafter
The imperial authority appears to have been less and less directly exercised. The new ceremonialism must have rendered the personal exercise of the multifarious imperial functions more difficult as before; and it is probable that the temptation to act more or less by deputy would have been strong even in the case of an energetic ruler. At all events we find that the real administration of government began about this time to pass into the hands of deputy-kings, — all of whom were members of the real Kuge clan of the Fujiwara.

This clan, which included the highest hereditary priesthood, represented a majority of the
ancient nobility, claiming divine descent.
Ninety-five out of the total one hundred
and fifty-five families of Kage belonged
to it, — including the five families,
Go-Sekke, from which alone the
Emperor was by tradition allowed
to choose his Empress. Its historic
name dates only from the reign of
the Emperor [Kwammu (782-806 AD)],
who bestowed it as an honour upon
Nakatomi no Kamatari; but the
clan had long previously held the
highest positions at court. By
the close of the seventh century
most of the executive power had
passed into its hands. Later
the office of Kwambaku, or Regent,
was established, and remained
hereditary in the house down to
modern times — ages after all real
power had been taken from the
descendants of Nakatomi no Kamatari.

But during almost five centuries the Fujiwara remained the real head of the country, and took every possible advantage of their position. All the civil offices were in the hands of Fujiwara men; all the wives and favorites of the Emperors were Fujiwara women.

The whole power of government was now kept in the hands of the clan; and the political authority of the Emperors ceased to exist.

Moreover, the succession was regulated entirely by the Fujiwara; and even the duration of each reign was made to depend upon their policy. It was deemed advisable to compel Emperors to abdicate at an early age, and after abdication to become Buddhist.
monarch, - the successor chosen being often a mere child. There is record of an emperor ascending the throne at the age of two, and abdicating at the age of four; another Mikado was appointed at the age of five; several at the age of ten. Yet the religious dignity of the throne remained undiminished, or, rather, continued to grow. The more the Mikado was withdrawn from public view by policy and by ceremonial, the more did his seclusion and inaccessibility serve to deepen the awe of the divine legend. Like the Lama of Tibet, the divine deity was made invisible to the multitude; and gradually
the belief arose that I look upon his face was death... It is said
that the Fujiwara were not satisfied even with these despotic
means of assuring their own domination, and that luxurious forms of
commerce were main-
dained within the palace for
the purpose of weakening the
character of young emperors
who might otherwise have found
the energy to assert the ancient
right of the throne.

Perhaps this usurpa-
dion—under prepared the
way for the rise of the mili-
itary power—has never been
rigidly interpreted. The history
of all the patriarchal societies
of ancient Europe will be found to illustrate the same phase of social evolution. At a certain period in the development of each we find the same thing happening,— the withdrawal of all political authority from the Priest-King, who is suffered, nevertheless, to retain the religious dignity. It may be a mistake to judge the policy of the Fujiwara as a policy of mere ambition and usurpa-
dion. The Fujiwara were a religious aristocracy, claiming divine origin,— clan-chiefs of a society in which religion and government were identical, and holding to that society much the same relation as that
of the Emperor in the ancient Athenian society. The Mikado had originally become supreme, magnetic, military commander, and religious head by consent of a majority of the clan chiefs, each of whom represented his own following. What the Heavenly Sovereign represented is the social aggregate. But as the power of the ruler extended with the growth of the nation, those who had formerly united to maintain that power began to find it dangerous. They decided to deprive the Heavenly Sovereign of all political and legal authority, without disturbing in any way his religious supremacy.

At Athens, at Sparta, at Rome, and elsewhere in ancient Europe the same policy was carried out, for the same reasons,
by religious means. The history of the early kings of Rome, as in-
-terpreted by M. de Coulanges, best illustrates the nature of the
antagonism developed between the
priest-rulers and the religious
art, divinity; but the same
thing took place in all the
Greek communities, with about
the same result. Everywhere
political power was taken away
from the early kings; but they
were mostly left in possession
of their religious duties and
privileges: they remained supreme
priests after having ceased to be
rulers. This was the case also
in Japan; and I imagine that
future Japanese historians will
be able to give us an account.
new interpretation of the Fujiwara episode, as reviewed in the light of modern sociology. In all events, there can be little doubt that, in curtailing the powers of the Heavenly Sovereign, the religion andocracy must have been activated by conservative precautions as well as by ambition. There had been various Emperors who made changes in the laws and customs—changes which could have been viewed with favour by many of the ancient nobility;—there had been an Emperor whose directions can today be written of only in Latin;—there had even been an Emperor—Kotoku—who, though "God Incarnate," and chief of the ancient faith, "despised the Way of the Gods," and cut down the holy grove of the shrine of Iku-Kuni-dama.
Kôlôku, for all his Buddhist (perhaps, indeed, because of it) was one of the worst and best of rulers; but the example of a benevolent sovereign desiring the Way of the Gods must have given the priests much matter for serious reflection.

Besides, there is another important fact to be noticed. The imperial household proper had become, in the course of centuries, entirely detached from the yôjâ; and the omnipotence of this unit, independent of all other units, constituted in itself a grave danger to aristocratic privileges and established institutions.

Too much and yet too little depend upon the personal character and will of an omnipotent God-King, capable of breaking with all.
clan-custom, and of abrogating clan-privileges. On the other hand, there was safety for all alike under the patriarchal rule of the clan, which could check every tendency on the part of any of its members to except pre-dominant influence at the expense of the real. But for obvious reasons the Imperial Cult, —traditional source of all authority and privilege, — could not be touched: it was only by main-taining and reinforcing it that the religious nobility could expect to keep the real power in their hands. They actually kept it for nearly five centuries.
The history of all the Japanese regencies, however, amply illustrates the general rule that wherever authority is ever as everywhere liable to fall itself supplanted by dependent authority, the native appears to have eventually become the victim of that luxury which they had themselves for reasons of policy introduced and maintained. Degenerating into a mere court-nobility, they made little effort to exert any direct authority in other than civil directions, entrusting military matters almost wholly to the Buke. In the sixteenth century the distinction between military and civil organization had been made upon the Chinese
plan; and the great military class then came into existence, and began to extend its power rapidly. Of the military clans proper, the most powerful were the Minamoto and the Taira. By defeating these clans the conduct of all important matters relating to war, the Fujiwara eventually lost their high position and influence. As soon as the Rurikō formed their selves strong enough tolay hands upon the reins of government—which has happened about the middle of the eleventh century, the Fujiwara supremacy became a thing of the past, although members of the clan continued to occupy positions of importance under various regents.
But the Baké could not realize their ambition without a bitter struggle among themselves, — the longest and the fiercest war in Japanese history. The Minamoto and the Taira were both Tengu; both claimed imperial descent. In the early part of the contest the Taira carried all before them; and it seemed that no power could hinder them from exterminating the rival clan. But fortune turned at last in favour of the Minamoto; and at the famous sea-fight of Dann-no-ura, in 1185, the Taira were themselves terminated.

Then began the reign...
of the Minamoto regency, or rather of the Shogun. I have elsewhere said that the title "Shogun" originally signified, as did the Roman military term Emperor, only a commander-in-chief; it now became the title of the supreme ruler de facto, in his double capacity of civil and military sovereign, — the King of Kings. From the accession of the Minamoto to power, the history of the Shogunate, — the long history of the military supremacy, — really begins; Japan thereafter, down to the present era of Meiji, having really two Emperors: the Heavenly Sovereign, or Nippon Incarnate, representing the
reign of the race; and the veritable Emperor, who wielded all the powers of the administration. No one sought to occupy thereby force the throne of the Sun's Succession, whence all authority was at least supposed to be derived. Regent or shōgun bowed down before it: divinity could not be usurped.

Yet peace did not follow upon the battle of Dan-no-ura: the clan wars raged at the great struggle of the Minamoto and the Taira, continued, at irregular intervals, for five centuries more; and the nation remained disintegrated. Nor did the
Minamoto long kept the supremacy which they had so dearly won. Departing their powers to the Hōjō family, they were supplanted by the Hōjō, just as the Fujiwara had been supplanted by the Taira. Three only of the Minamoto shōguns really exercised rule. During the whole of the Taira-teen the century, and for some time afterwards, the Hōjō continued to govern the country; and it is noted worthy that these never assumed the title of shōgun, but professed to be merely shōgunal dependents. Thus a triple-headed government appeared to exist; for the Minamoto kept up a kind of court at Kamakura. But they faded into mere shadow, and are yet remembered by the significant appellation of "Puppet shōgun."
There was nothing shadowy, however, about the administration of the Hojo,
— men of immense energy and ability. By them Emperor or
Shogun could be deposed and
vanquished without contest; and
the helplessness of the Shogunate
con be inferred from the fact,
that the seventh Hojo regent,
before deposing the seventh Shogun,
sent him home in a palanquin,
head downwards and heels upwards.
Nevertheless the Hojo suffered
the phantom—shogunate— to linger
on, until 1333. Though
unsent-
palons in their methods, these
regents were capable rulers;
and proved themselves able to
save the country in a great
emergency,— the famous invasion
attempted by Kublai Khan in 1281. Aided by a fortunate typhoon, which is said to have destroyed the hostile fleet in answer to prayer offered up at the national shrines, the Hōjō were able to repel this invasion. They were less successful in dealing with certain domestic disorders, especially those fomented by the turbulent Buddhist priesthood. During the thirteenth century, Buddhism had developed into a great military power, strangely like the church-military of the European middle ages: the period of soldier-priests and fighting bishops. The Buddhist monasteries had been converted into fortresses filled with men-at-arms;
Buddhist meance had more than once carried favor with the sacred succession of the imperial court. At an early day, Hōjō, the far-seeing founder of the Minamoto dynasty, had observed a militant tendency in Buddhism, and had attempted to check it by forbidding all priest and monks either to bear arms, or to maintain armed retainers. But his successors had been careless about enforcing these prohibitions; and the Buddhist military power developed so quickly that the shrewdness Hōjō were doubtful of their ability to cope with it. Eventually this power proved capable of giving them serious trouble. The ninety-sixth Mikado, Go-Daigo, found course
A revolt against the dynasty of the
Yōjō; and the Buddhist soldier
took part with him. He was
promptly defeated, and banished
from the islands of Oki; but his
case was soon espoused by pow-
erful lords, who had long
chafed under the despotism of
the regency. These assembled their
forces, rescued the banished emper-
or, and combated in a desperate
attack upon the regent’s capital,
Kamakura. The city was stormed
and burned; and the loss of
the Yōjō rulers, after a brave
but vain defense, performed
harakiri. Thus Okōgunmi
and regency vanished together,
in 1333.
For the moment the whole power of administration had been restored to the Mikado. Unfortunately for himself and for the country, K. Daigo was too feeble of character to avail himself of this great opportunity. He revived the dead Ohōjūn by appointing his own son Ohōjūn; he swarilgly ignored the services of those whose loyalty and courage had restored him; and he fortuitously strengthened the hands of those whom he had every reason to fear. As a consequence there happened the most serious political catastrophe in the history of Japan, — a division of the imperial house against itself.
The unpreparedness, however, of the Hōjō regents had prepared the possibility of such an event. During the last years of the thirteenth century, there were living at the same time in Kyoto, besides the reigning Mikado, no less than three dependent emperors. To bring about a contest for the succession was therefore an easy matter; and this was done accomplished by the treacherous general Aoki Kaga Taneuji, whom Go-Daigo had unjustly shown especial favor. Aoki Kaga had betrayed the Hōjō in order to help the restoration of Go-Daigo; — he
subsequently would have betrayed the trust of Go-Daigo in order to seize the administrative power. The Emperor discovered this reasonable purpose when too late, and sent against Achikaga an army which was promptly defeated. After some further contest, Achikaga mastered the capital, drove Go-Daigo a second time into exile, set up a rival emperor, and established a new Shogunate. Now for the first time, two branches of the imperial family, each supported by powerful lords, contended for the
rapid of succession. That of
which Go-Daigo remained
the acting representative, is
known in history as the
Southern Branch (Nancho),
and by Japanese historians
is held to be the only legitimate
branch. The other was called
the Northern Branch (Hokuchô),
and was maintained at Kyôto
by the power of the Ashikaga
clan; while Go-Daigo, find-
ing refuge in a Buddhist
monastery, retained the insignia
of empire... Thereafter, for
a period of fifty-six years
Japan continued to have two
Mikado; and the resounding
disorder was such as to imperil the national integrity. It would have been no easy matter for the people to decide which Emperor possessed the better claim. Till then, the imperial presence had represented the national divinity; and the imperial palace had been regarded as the temple of the national religion: the division main-dained by the Ashikaga usurpers. Therefore the confusion nothing less than the breaking up of the whole tradition upon which existing society had been built. The confusion became greater as greater, the danger increased more and more, until
the Ashikaga themselves took alarm. They managed then to end the trouble by persuading the fifth Mikado of the Southern Dynasty, Go-Kaméyama, to surrender his insignia to the reigning Mikado of the Northern Dynasty, Go-Komaba. This having been done, in 1392, Go-Kaméyama was honoured with the title of retired emperor, and Go-Komaba was practically acknowledged as legitimate emperor. But the names of the other four emperors of the Northern dynasty are still excluded from the official list.

The Ashikaga shōgunate thus ascended the sup-
-reme peril; but the period of these military domination, which endured until 1573, was destined to remain the darkest in Japanese history. The Ashikaga gave the country fifteen rulers, several of whom were men of great ability; they tried to encourage industry; they cultivated literature and the arts; but they could not live in peace. Fresh disputes arose; and lords outside the shogunate could not subdue made war upon each other. To such a condition of terror was the capital reduced that the court nobility fled from it and took refuge with daimyō powerful enough to afford them protection.

-2. Robbins became rich
Throughout the land; no piracy terrorized the seas. The Shogunate itself was reduced to the humiliation of paying tribute to China. Agriculture and industry at last ceased to exist outside of the domains of certain powerful lords. Provinces became waste; and famine, earthquakes, and pestilence added their horror to the misery of ceaseless war.

The people prevailing may be best understood from the fact that when the emperor known as Go-Tsuchimiakado—one hundred and second of the Omi's succession—died in the year 1508, his corpse had to be kept at the palace for 49 days,
because the expenses of the funeral could not be defrayed. Until 1573 the shōgun continued in the shōgunate meanwhile degener-
erated into insignificance. Then a strong captain arose and ended the house of Ashi-
taka, and seized the reins of power. This usurper was Oda Nobunaga; and the
imperial dignity was amply pro-
voked. Had it not occurred, Japan might never have entered upon an era of peace.

For there had been no peace since the fifth century. No emperor or regent or shōgun
had ever been able to impose his rule firmly upon the whole
country. Somewhere or other there were always wars of clan with clan. By the end of the sixteenth century personal safety could be found only under the protection of some military leader, able to exact his own terms for the favour of such protection. The question of the imperial succession, which had almost wrecked the empire during the fourteenth century, might be raised again at any time by some reckless faction, with the probable result of ruining civilization, and forcing the nation back to its primitive state of barbarism. Never did the future of Japan appear so dark as at the moment when Oda Nobunaga
suddenly found himself the strongest man in the empire, and leader of the most formidable army that had ever obeyed a single head. This man, a descendant of Ch'in To priests, was above all things a patriot. He did not seek the title of Dōgūn, and never received it. His hope was to save the country; and he saw that this could be done only by centralizing all feudal power under one control, and thereby enforcing law. Looking about him for the ways and means of effecting this centralization, he perceived that one of the most fatal obstacles to be removed was that created by the power of Buddhism, militant, the feudal Buddhism developed
under the Hōjō regency, and especially represented by the great Khan and Tendai sects. As both had already given aid to his enemies, it was easy to find a cause for quarrel; so the first proceeded against the Tendai. The campaign was conducted with ferocious vigour; the monastery-fortresses of Hōjō-sons were stormed and razed, and all the priests with all their adherents put to the sword—no mercy being shown even to women and children. By nature Nobunaga was not cruel; but his policy was ruthless, and he knew when and why to strike hard.

The power of the Tendai sect
before this massacre may be inferred from the fact that three thousand monastery buildings were burnt at Higashi-yama. The chief seat of the Honjô-nomi, with head-quarters at Osaka, was scarcely less powerful; and its monastery, occupying the site of the present Osaka castle, was one of the strongest fortresses in the country. Nobunaga waited several years, then
I prepare for the attack. The soldiers - priests defended themselves well; upwards of fifty thousand lives are said to have been lost in the siege; - yet only the personal intervention of the emperor prevented the slaying of the
strongholds, and the slaughter of every being within its walls. Though respect for the Emperor, Nobunaga agreed to spare the lives of the Chin priests; they were only as possessed, and scattered, as their power forever broken. Buddhism having been thus effectually crippled, Nobunaga was able to draw his attention to the warring clans. Supposed to be the greatest generals that the nation ever produced, — Hideyoshi and Ieyasu, — he proceeded to enforce pacification and order; and his grand purpose would probably have been soon accomplished, but for the revengeful treachery of a subordinate, who bought about his death in 1582.
Nobunaga, with Taira blood in his veins, had been essentially an artocrat, when this all the aptitudes of his great race for administration, and versed in all the traditions of diplomacy. His avenger and successor, Hideyoshi, was a totally different type of soldier: a son of peasants, an undramatic genius who had won his way to high command by shrewdness and courage, national skill at arms, and immense urban capacity for all the chess-play of war. With the great purpose of Nobunaga he had always been in sympathy; and he actually carried it out, subduing the entire...
comity, from north to south, in the name of the Emperor, by whom he was appointed Regent (Kwambaku). Thus universal peace was temporarily established. But the vast military powers which Hideyoshi had collected and disciplined, determined to become refractory. He found employment for them by declaring an unprovoked war against Korea, whence he hoped to effect the conquest of China. This war with Korea opened in 1592, and dragged on unsatisfactorily until 1598, when Hideyoshi died. He had proved himself one of the greatest soldiers ever born, but not one of the best.
among rulers. Perhaps the issue of the war in Korea would have been more fortunate, if he could have ventured to conduct it himself.
As a matter of fact, it merely exhausted the force of both Combined and Japan had little to show for her dead, bought victories abroad except the Mimidzuka or "Ear-Monument" at Nara, marking the spot where fiercely thousands pairs of foreign ears, cut from the pickled heads of slain, were buried in the grounds of the temple of Daibutsu...

In the vacant place of power then stepped the most remarkable man that
Japan ever produced,—Tokugawa Iyéyasu. Iyéyasu was of Minamoto descent, and an aristocrat in the marrow of his bones. As a soldier he was scarcely inferior to Hidéyoshi, whom he once defeated, but he was much more than a soldier—a far-sighted statesman, an incomparable diplomat, and something of a scholar. Cool, cautious, serene; —a most prudent, yet generous; —stone, yet humane,—by the range and the versatility of his genius he might be not unfavorably contrasted with Julius Caesar. As that Nobunaga and Hidéyoshi had wishes to do, or failed to do, Iyéyasu speedily accomplished.
After fulfilling Hidéyoshi's dying injunction, not to leave the troops in Korea "to become ghosts haunting a foreign land," that is to say, in the condition of spirits without a cult, Ieyasu had to face a formidable league of lords resolved to dispute his claim to rule. The terrific battle of Okehazama left him master of the country; and he at once took measures to consolidate his power, and to perfect, even to the least detail, all the machinery of military government. To Shogun, he reorganized the daimioles, redivided a majority of fiefs among those whom he could trust, creating new military grades on
orders, and so balances the power of the greater daimyō as to make it next to impossible for them to dare a revolt. Later on the daimyō were even required to furnish security for their good behaviour: they were obliged to pass a certain time of the year* in the shogun's capital, leaving their families as hostages during the rest of the year. The entire administration was readjusted upon a simple and sagacious plan; and the Laws of Ieyasu prove him to have been an excellent legislator. For the first time in Japanese history, the nation was integrated, - integrated, at least, in so far as the peculiar nature of the

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*The period of obligatory residence in Edo was not the same for all daimyō. In some cases the obligation seems to have extended to their families; in others the requirement was to pass every alternate year in the capital.
social unit rendered possible. The councils of the founder of Japan were followed by his successors; and the Tokugawa Shogunate, which lasted until 1867, gave the country fifteen military sovereigns. Under these, Japan enjoyed both peace and prosperity for the time of two hundred and fifty years; and her society was thus enabled to develop to the full limits of its peculiar type. Industries and arts developed in new and wonderful ways; literature for the first time enjoyed patronage. The national cult was carefully maintained; and all precautions were taken to prevent the recurrence of another such contest for the imperial succession as had nearly ruined the country in the fourteenth century.
We have seen that the history of military rule in Japan embraces nearly the whole period of its authentic history, down to modern times, and closes with the second period of national unification. The first period has been reached when the clans first accepted the leadership of the chief of the greatest clan,—literally revered as the Heavenly Sovereign, Supreme Pontiff, Supreme Arbiter, Supreme Commander, and Supreme Magistrate. How long a time was required for this primal unification, under a patriarchal monarchy, we
cannot know; but we have learned that the latter, in degeneration, under a dynasty, occupied considerably more than a thousand years. Now the extraordinary fact to note is that, during all these centuries, the imperial cult was carefully maintained by even the enemies of the Mikado;—the only legitimate ruler being, in national belief, the Tennô, "Son of Heaven,"—the Tennô, "Heaven-King." Through every period of disorder, the Offspring of the Sun was the object of national worship, and his palace the Temple of the national faith. Great emperors might coerce the imperial will; but they
stayed themselves, none the less, the worshippers and slaves of the immovable deity; and they would not more have thought of dying to occupy his throne, than they would have thought of dying to abolish all religion by decree. Once only, by the arbitrary will of the Ashikaga shōguns, the imperial cult had been seriously interfered with; and the social earthquake consequent upon that division of the imperial house, appeased the usurpers of the enormity of their blunder... Only the indecency of the imperial succes- sion, the uninterrupted maintenance of the imperial...
worship, made it possible even for
Iyésu to clamp together the
indissoluble units of society.

- Herbert Spencer has
dargued that student of sociology and
recognise that religious dynasties
have extraordinary powers of
longevity, because they possess
extraordinary power to resist
change; whereas military
dynasties, depending for their
permanence, upon the individual
character of their sovereigns,
are particularly liable to dis-
integration.

The immense
duration of the Japanese im-
perial dynasty, as compared
with the history of the various
oligarchies and regencies re-
presenting a mere military
domination, illustrates this teaching in a most remarkable way.

Back through twenty-five hundred years we can follow the line of the imperial succession, till it vanishes out of sight into the mystery of the past. Here we have evidence of that extreme power of resisting all changes which is inherently characteristic of religious conservatism; on the other hand, the history of every shogunate and regency proves the tendency to regulation of institutions having no religious foundation, and therefore no religious power of cohesion. The remarkable
duration of the Fujiwara rule, as compared with others, may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that the Fujiwara clan represented a religious, not a military aristocracy. Even the marvellous military structure devised by Igyōasu had begun to decay long before alien aggression precipitated its inevitable collapse.