- approached that stage of industrial development which, in the ancient European societies, normally brought about the first political struggles between rich and poor. Under social organization, it made industrial oppression impossible: the commercial classes were kept at the bottom of society, — under the feet even of those who, in more highly evolved communities, are now at the mercy of money-power.

But now those commercial classes, set free and highly privi-leged, are silently and swiftly pushing the aristocratic ruling-class from power, — are becoming supremely important. And under
new order of things, forms of social misery, never before known in the history of the race, are being developed. Some idea of this misery may be obtained from the fact that the number of poor people in Tokyo unable to pay their annual resident tax is upwards of 50,000; yet the amount of the tax is only 20 yen, or five pence English money. Prior to the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a minority there was never any such want in any part of Japan, except, of course, as a temporary consequence of war.

McGrath

The early history of European civilization supplies an
In the Greek and Latin communities, up to the time of the dissolution of the gens, there was no poverty in the modern meaning of that word. Slavery, with some few exceptions, existed only in the mild domestic form; there were yet no commercial oligarchies, nor industrial oppressions; and the various cities and states were ruled, after political power had been taken from the east, kings, by military aristocracies which also exercised religious functions. There was yet little trade in the modern sociopolitical sense of the term; and money, as current coinage, came in 2 centuries, only in the seventh century.
before Christ, misery did not exist. Under any patriarchal system, based upon ancestor worship, there is no misery, as a consequence of poverty, except such as may be temporarily created by disease, famine, or want. As soon as it comes, it comes to all alike. In such a state of society, everybody is in the service of somebody, and receives in exchange for service all the necessaries of life: there is no need for any one to trouble himself about the means of living. Also, in such a patriarchal community, which is self-sufficing, there is...
little need of money: barter takes the place of trade...
In all these respects the condi-
tions of Old Japan offered
a close parallel to the conditions
of patriarchal societies in ancient
Europe. While the uji or clan
existed, there was no misery
except as a result of war.
Throughout famine, or pestilence. Thro'out
famine, or pestilence. Thro'out
society, except in the small
commercial class, the need
of money was rare; and such
of money was rare; and such
courage as existed was little
suited to general circulation.
Taxes were paid in rice and
other produce. As the lord
nourished his retainers, so the
the farmer for his labourers, the artisan for his apprentices and journeymen, the merchant for his clerks. Everybody was fed; and there was no need, in ordinary times at least, for any one to go hungry. It was only with the breaking-up of the clan-system in Japan that the possibility of starvation for the worker first came into existence. And so, in antique Europe, the landed and plebeian-slan developed, in the like conditions, into a democracy clamouring for suffrage and all political rights, as in Japan have the

samurai cared for his dependants,
common people developed the political instinct, in self-protection.

It will be remembered that, in Greek and Roman societies, the aristocracy formed upon religious tradition and military power had to give way to an oligarchy of wealth, and how there subsequently came into existence a democratic form of government — democratic, not in the modern, but in the old Greek meaning. At a later day the results of popular suffrage were the breaking up of this democratic government, and the civilisation of an abro-
- gious struggle between rich and
poor. After that shift had begun there was no more security for life or property until the Roman conquest enforced order. Now it seems not unlikely that there will be witness in Japan, at no very distant day, a strong tendency to repeat the history of the old Greek anarchy, with the constant increase of poverty and pressure of population, and the consequent accumulation of wealth in the hands of a new industrial class, the peril is obvious. Thus far the nation has partly borne all changes, relying upon the experience of its past, and borrowing implicitly
to its rulers. But should weakness in no way be so permitted to augment that the presence of help to keep from starving becomes imperative for the millions, the long patience of the long trust may fail.

And then, I repeat a figure effectively used by Professor Spurzheim, of primitive man, finding in the valley of the shadow of death, may rise up and take the management of affairs in his own hands, and fight savagely for the right of existence. As popular instinct is not too
due to divine the first cause of this misery in the introduction of Western industrial methods, it is unpleasant to reflect what such an upheaval might signify.

But nothing of moment has yet been done to ameliorate the condition of the worked class of operatives, now estimated to exceed half a million.

Mr. de Boulanger, has pointed out that the absence of individual liberty was the real cause of the disorders and the final ruin of the Greek societies. Rome suffered less,
and survived, and dominated,—because within her boundaries the freedom of the individual had been more respected... How the absence of individual freedom in modern Japan would certainly appear to be nothing less than a national danger. For those very habits of unquestioning obedience, and loyalty, and respect for authority, which made feudal society possible, are likely to render a true democratic régime impossible, and would lead to bringing about a state of anarchy. Only races long accustomed to personal liberty,—liberty to think about matters of ethics apart from...
matters of government, — liberty to consider questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, in dependence of political authority, — are able to face without risk the peril now menacing Japan. For there social disintegration takes in Japan the same course which it followed in the old European societies, — unchecked by any precautionary legislation, — and to bring about another social revolution, the consequence could scarcely be less than utter ruin. In the antique world of Europe, the total disintegra-


tion of the patriarchal system occupied centuries: it was slow, and it was normal
... had been brought about by external forces. In Japan, on the contrary, this old feudal
system is taking place under enormous outside pressure, opera-
tively with the rapidity of electricity and steam. In
those societies the changes were
affected in about three hundred
years; in Japan it is hardly
more than thirty years since
the patriarchal system was
degraded dissolved and the
industrial system reshapen;
yet already the danger of
anarchy is in sight, and the
population is astonishingly aug-
mended by more than ten millions—already begins to experience all the forms of misery developed by war and under industrial conditions.

It was perhaps inevitable and the greatest freedom accorded under the new order of things should have been given to the direction of greatest danger. Though the government cannot be said to have done much for any form of competition within the sphere of its own direct control, it has done even more than could have been reasonably expected on
behalf of national industrial com-
petition. Lores have been
lavishly advanced, subsidies
generously allowed; on, in
spite of various panics and
failures, the results have been
productions. Within thirty
years the value of articles
manufactured for export has
risen from half-a-million
to five hundred million. Yet
But this immense develop-
ment has been effected at
serious cost in other direc-
tions. The old methods
of family-production, and
therefore most of the beautiful
industries and arts, for which Japan has been so long famous, now seem doomed beyond hope; and instead of the ancient kindly relations between master and workers there have been brought into existence,—with no legislation to restrain inhumanity,—all the horrors of factory-life at its worst. The new combinations of capital have actually re-established servitude, under harsher forms than ever were endured under the feudal era;—the misery of the women and children subjected to that servitude is a public scandal, and proves strange possibilities of cruelty on the part of a people once
renowned for kindness — kindness even to animals.

There is now a humane outcry for reform; and earnest efforts have been made, and will be made, to secure legislation for the protection of operatives. But, as might be expected, these efforts have been hitherto strongly opposed by manufacturing companies and syndicates with the declaration that any government interference with factory management will greatly hamper, if not crippled, enterprise, and
hinder competition with foreign industry. Less than twenty years ago the very same arguments were used in England to oppose the efforts then being made to improve the condition of the industrial classes; and that opposition was challenged by Professor Huxley in a noble address, which every Japanese legislator would do well to read today. Speaking of the reforms in progress during 1888, the professor said:
"If it is said that the carrying out of such arrangements is more indicated must enhance the cost of production, and thus handicap the producers in the race of competition, I venture, in the first place, to doubt the fact; but, if it be so, it really that industrial society has to face a dilemma, either alternative of which threatens destruction.

On the one hand, a population, the labour of which is sufficiently remunerated, may be physically and morally healthy, and socially stable, but may fail in industrial competition by reason of the dearness of its produce. On the other hand, a population the labour of which is insufficiently remunerated, must become physically and morall
unhealthy, and socially unstable; and though it may succeed for a while in competition, by reason of the cheapness of its produce, it succumbs in the end, through hideous misery and degradation, to utter ruin.

"Well, if these be the only alternatives, let us for ourselves and our children choose the former, and, if need be, observe little men. But I do not believe that a stable society made up of healthy, vigorous, instructed, and self-reliant people would ever in our serious risk of that fate. They are not likely to be troubled with many competitors of the same character, just yet; and they may be safely trusted to find a way of holding their own."

If the future of Japan could depend upon her army and her navy, — upon the high courage of her people and their readiness to die by the hundred thousand for ideals of honour and of duty, — there would be small cause for alarm in the present state of affairs. Unfortunately her future must depend upon other qualities than courage, other abilities than those of sacrifice; and her struggle hereafter must be one in which her social organization will place her at an immense disadvantage.
The capacity for industrial cooperation cannot be made to depend upon the misery of women and children; it must depend upon the intelligent freedom of the individual and the society which suppresses this freedom, or suffers it to be suppressed, must remain to be rejected for competition with societies in which the liberties of the individual are strictly maintained. While Japan continues to think and act by groups, even by groups of industrial companies, so long she must always continue incapable of her best. Her ancient social experience is not sufficient to avail her for the
future international struggle,—rather it must sometimes impede her as so much dead weight. Dead, in the ghostliest sense of the word,—the vindexless pressure upon her life of numberless vanished generations. She will have not only to strive against colossal odds in her rivalry with more plastic and more forceful societies;—she will have to strive much more against the power of her phantom past.
felt it were a gross error to imagine that she has nothing further to gain from her ancestral faith. All her modern successes have been aided by it; so all her modern failures have been marked by needless breaking with its ancient custom. She could compel her people, by a simple fiat, to adopt the civilization of the West, with all its pain and struggle, only because that people had been trained for ages in submission and loyalty and sacrifice; and she alone has not yet come in which she can afford to cast away the whole of her
moral part. More freedom indeed she requires — but freedom res- 
drained by wisdom; freedom to 
think and act and strive for 
self as well as for others; — or 
freedom to oppress the weak, or 
exploit the simple. And 
the new qualities of her industrial 
life can find no justification 
in the tradition of her ancient 
faith, which exacted absolute 
obedience from the dependant; 
but equally required the duty 
of kindness from the master. 
In so far as she has permitted 
her people to depart from the 
way of kindness, she herself 
has surely departed from the 
Way of the Lord...
While the domestic future appears dark, a vision of death and darkness, an
evil dream comes often to those who love Japan: the fear that all her efforts are being
directed, with desperate heroism, to prepare the land for the sojourn of peoples older
by centuries in commercial experience; that her thousands
of miles of railroads and
telegraphs, her mines and
forges, her arsenals and fac-
tiories, her docks and fleets,
are being put in order for the use of foreign capital; that her admirable army and
her heroic navy may be
doomed to make their last
sacrifices in hopeless contest against some combination of greedy States, provoked or encouraged by circumstances beyond the power of government to control.

... Will the statesmanship that has already guided Japan through so many storms prove able to cope with this gathering peril?
Competition and Peril.
Everywhere the course of human civilization has been shaped by the same evolutionary laws; and as the earlier history of the ancient European communities can help us understand the social conditions of China and Japan, so a later period of the same history can help us divine something of the probable future of the New Japan. It has been shown by the author...
of La Cité Antique, and the history of all the ancient Greek and Latin communities included four revolutionary periods. The first revolution had everywhere for its issue the withdrawal of political power from the priest-king, who was nevertheless allowed to retain his religious authority. The second revolutionary period witnessed the breaking up of the gens or yevos, the enfranchisement of the client from the authority of the patron, and several important changes in the legal constitution of the family.

The third revolutionary period saw

* Not excepting Sparta. The Spartan society was essentially much in advance of the Ionian societies; the patriarchal clan having been dissolved at some very early period. Sparta kept its kings; but affairs of civil justice were regulated by the Senate, and affairs of criminal justice by the Ephors, who also had the power to declare war and to make treaties of peace. After the first great revolution of Spartan history, the king was deprived of power in civil matters, in criminal matters, and in military matters; he retained only his ecclesiastical office. (See for details, La Cité Antique, pp. 285–287.)
the weakening of the religious and military aristocracy, the entrance of the common people into the rights of citizenship, and the rise of a democracy of wealth, presently to be replaced by a democracy of poverty. The fourth revolutionary period witnesses the first bitter struggles between the rich and poor, the final triumph of anarchy, and the consequent establishment of a new and horrible form of despotism, — the despotism of the popular tyrant.

To these four revolutionary periods, the social history of Old Japan presents but two
correspondence. The first Japanese revolutionary period was represented by the Fujiwara usurpation of the imperial civil and military autocracy, after which event the aristocracy, republics or military, really governed Japan until 3 or 5
own time. At the event of the rise of the military power, and the concentration of authority under the Tokugawa Shogunate properly belong to the first revolutionary period. As the time of the opening of Japan, society had not evolved as far as beyond a stage corresponding to that of the ancient Western societies in the seventh or eighth century before Christ. The
second revolutionary period really began only with the reconstruction of society in 1871. But within the space of a single generation then after, Japan entered upon her third revolutionary period. Already the influence of the older aristocracy is threatened by the sudden rise of a new aristocracy of wealth, a new industrial power probably destined to become omnipotent in politics. The disintegration (now proceeding) of the clan, the changes in the legal constitution, the disintegration of the family, the entrance of the people into the enjoyment of political rights, none of these hastened the coming
transfer of power. There is every indication that, in the present order of things, the third revolutionary period will run its course rapidly; and then a fourth revolutionary period, fraught with serious danger, would be an immediate prospect.

Consider the bewildering rapidity of recent changes, from the reconstruction of society in 1871 to the opening of the first national parliament in 1891. Born in the middle of the nineteenth century, the nation had remained in the condition common to European patriarchal communities two hundred years ago: society had indeed entered upon a second
period of integration, but had traversed only one great revolution. And then the comedy was suddenly hurried through two more social revolutions of the most extraordinary kind, — symbolized by the abolition of the daimios, the suppression of the military class, the substitution of a plebiscite for an aristocratic army, popular franchise, popular evolution of a real democracy, industrial expansion, the rise of a new aristocracy of wealth, and popular representation in government! Now Japan had never developed a wealthy and powerful middle class; she had not been ap-