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On the Stability of the Core in a Public Good Economy
http://hdl.handle.net/10110/8795
http://hdl.handle.net/10110/879573e434b0-b522-411e-a4b7-ad58d37cbcb5
Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
公開日 | 2012-04-17 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | On the Stability of the Core in a Public Good Economy | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | indirect domination | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | core | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | sophisticated stable set | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | public good economy | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
アクセス権 | ||||||
アクセス権 | metadata only access | |||||
アクセス権URI | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb | |||||
著者 |
Hirai, Toshiyuki
× Hirai, Toshiyuki |
|||||
著者別名 | ||||||
姓名 | 平井, 俊行 | |||||
抄録 | ||||||
内容記述 | In a public good economy, the core defined in the allocation space may not satisfy the external stability. Therefore, the core may differ from the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable set in the allocation space, whereas the core coincides with the stable set in the payoff space. We investigate indirect domination due to Harsanyi (1974, Management Science 20, 1472-1495) in the allocation space. We show that any sequence of dominations with a certain property constitutes indirect domination and eventually reaches into the core in the allocation space. Consequently, the core turns out to satisfy the external stability if we employ indirect domination instead of standard domination, and coincides with the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space. We also discuss the equivalence of the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space and the (sophisticated) stable set in the payoff space. | |||||
引用 | ||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper, No.270, 2012.4, Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||
書誌情報 | 巻 270, 発行日 2012-04-17 | |||||
フォーマット | ||||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | AM | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||
出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||
資源タイプ(DSpace) | ||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper | |||||
シリーズ | ||||||
関連名称 | Working Paper;No.270 |