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Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
https://doi.org/10.15099/00016451
https://doi.org/10.15099/0001645106c80418-b39f-4124-a9d4-a4ef2fb6c769
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||||
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公開日 | 2016-10-04 | |||||||
タイトル | ||||||||
タイトル | Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies | |||||||
言語 | ||||||||
言語 | eng | |||||||
キーワード | ||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
主題 | farsighted stable set | |||||||
キーワード | ||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
主題 | dominant punishment strategy | |||||||
キーワード | ||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
主題 | inclusive set | |||||||
キーワード | ||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
主題 | strict α-core | |||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||
資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||
ID登録 | ||||||||
ID登録 | 10.15099/00016451 | |||||||
ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||||
著者 |
Hirai, Toshiyuki
× Hirai, Toshiyuki
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著者別名 | ||||||||
識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||
識別子 | 107 | |||||||
識別子Scheme | e-Rad | |||||||
識別子URI | https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/nrid/1000000383951 | |||||||
識別子 | 00383951 | |||||||
姓名 | 平井, 俊行 | |||||||
抄録 | ||||||||
内容記述 | We investigate the farsighted stable set in a class of strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. In this class of games, each player has a strategy that uniformly minimizes the other players’ payoffs for any given strategies of other players. We particularly investigate a special class of the farsighted stable sets each of which consists of strategy profiles yielding a single payoff vector. We call such farsighted stable sets as the single-payoff farsighted stable sets. We propose a concept called the inclusive set that completely characterizes the single-payoff farsighted stable sets in the strategic games with dominant punishment strategies. We also show that the set of payoff vectors yielded by the single-payoff farsighted stable sets is closely related to the strict -core in strategic games. Further, we apply the results to the strategic games where each player has two strategies and strategic games associated with some market models. | |||||||
内容記述 | ||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
内容記述 | First version: September 30, 2016 Revised version: October 24, 2016 |
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引用 | ||||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper, No.301, 2016.10, Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||||
書誌情報 |
Working Paper, No.301, 2016.10.24, Faculty of economics, university of toyama 巻 301, p. 1-29, 発行日 2016-10-24 |
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フォーマット | ||||||||
内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||||
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出版タイプ | AM | |||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa | |||||||
出版者 | ||||||||
出版者 | Faculty of economics, university of toyama | |||||||
資源タイプ(DSpace) | ||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
内容記述 | Working Paper | |||||||
シリーズ | ||||||||
関連名称 | Working Paper / No.301 |